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"A WOMAN'S PLACE .. .": COMBATING
SEX-BASED PREJUDICES IN JURY
TRIALS THROUGH VOIR DIRE
Mark Soler*
[Women] are declared to be better than men; an empty com-
pliment, which must provoke a bitter smile from every woman
of spirit, since there is no other situation in life in which it is
considered the established order, and quite natural and suit-
able, that the better should obey the worse.'
The attempt to force a jury to become mentally blind to the
[appearance] of the accused sitting before them involves both
an impossibility in practice and a fiction in theory.2
I. INTRODUCTION
In the law, as in the other institutions of our society, women
have long been subject to sex-based discrimination.' A classic
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1. J.S. MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (1869).
2. Boykin v. People, 22 Colo. 496, 45 P. 415 (1896).
3. On discrimination against women within the substantive law, see generally
KANowrrz, WOMEN AND THE LAW (1969) [hereinafter cited as KANowrrz].
On sexist discrimination in the legal status of women, see generally PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, AMERICAN WOMEN (1963) and
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1963); CITIZENS'
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
FAMILY LAW AND POLICY (1968), REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON HEALTH AND
WELFARE (1968), REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LABOR STANDARDS (1968), and
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON SOCIAL INSURANCE AND TAXES (1968); THE PRESI-
DENT'S TASK FORCE ON WOMENS RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, REPORT: A MAT-
TER OF SIMPLE JUSTICE (1970); WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, HAND-
BOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS (1969); Cavanagh, "A Little Dearer than His Horse":
Legal Stereotypes and the Feminine Personality, 6 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB.
L. REv. 260 (1971); Seidenberg, The Submissive Majority: Modern Trends in the
Law Concerning Women's Rights, 55 CORN. L. REV. 262 (1970), all cited in
Brown, Emerson, Falk, and Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Con-
stitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, n.2 (1971)
1hereinafter cited as The Equal Rights Amendment]; Schulder, Does the Law
Oppress Women? in SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL 139 (R. Morgan ed. 1970); Rawalt,
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statement of sexism in the substance of the law is Blackstone's
explanation of coverture as the legal status of the wife during
marriage:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law:
that is, the very being or legal existence of the women is sus-
pended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and
consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing,
protection, and cover she performs every thing. . . . For
this reason, a man cannot grant anything to his wife, or enter
into covenant with her: for the grant would be to suppose
her separate existence; and to covenant with her, would be
only to covenant with himself. .... 4
The United States Supreme Court long embraced the attitude
toward women implicit in Blackstone's treatise. In 1884, the
Court declared that "[t]he right to follow any of the common
occupations of life is an inalienable right . . . formulated in the
Declaration of Independence . . . a large ingredient in the civil
liberty of the citizen. ' 5  The Court subsequently struck down
statutes and ordinances which restricted the ability of men, citizens
or non-citizens, to follow "the common occupations of life,"6 and,
in Truax v. Raich, it declared that
[i]t requires no argument to show 'that the right to work for
a living in the common occupations of the community is of
the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that
it was the purpose of the [fourteenth] amendment to secure.7
When it came to women, however, the Supreme Court saw
things in a diffent light. When Myra Bradwell sought to prac-
tice law in Illinois, the Court upheld the denial of a license to her
on the ground that she was unfit to practice law because she was
a woman. Justice Bradley declared:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of
civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which
is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature
of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly
belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood.8
Litigating Sex Discrimination Cases, 4 FAMILY L.Q. 44 (1970); The Equal Rights
Amendment, supra.
4. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Bk. I, Ch.
15, 442-43 (1774).
5. Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 762 (1884).
6. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (cook); Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S.
630 (1914) (freight train conductor); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
(laundry operator).
7. 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
8. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
Mr. Justice Bradley added:
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While "protective" legislation fixing maximum hours of labor for
men had been struck down,9 the Court upheld an Oregon statute
fixing the maximum number of working hours for women, and
its rationale was clear:
That woman's physical structure and the performance of
maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle
for subsistence is obvious. This is especially true when the
burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they are
not, by abundant testimony of the medical fraternity continu-
ance for a long time on her feet at work, repeating this from
day to day, tends to injurious effects upon the body, and as
healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physi-
cal well-being of women becomes an object of public interest
and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the
race.
Still again, history discloses the fact that woman has
always been dependent upon man. He established his con-
trol at the outset by superior physical strength, and this con-
trol in various forms with diminishing intensity, has continued
to ,the present.10
Discrimination against women is no less evident in the prac-
tice of law and in the courts. In 1967, for example, of the
300,000 lawyers in America, fewer than 3 percent were women."
This same study revealed that women lawyers earned about
$2,000 less per year than do men upon graduation from law
school; five years later, the differential is about $4,000, and nine
years later, almost $8,000.12 Significantly more women attorneys
spend their time doing trust and estate work or handling domestic
relations problems; significantly more men handle litigation or
work in the corporate area.' 3  The differences in income or work'
area clearly have nothing to do with the relative abilities of men
and women. In a study of twenty-five hundred law school gradu-
ates, no significant differences were found between men and
women either in class rank in law school or in participation on
It is true that many women are unmarried and not affected by any
of the duties, complications, and incapacities arising out of the married
state, but these are exceptions to the general rule. The paramount des-
tiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices
of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of
civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of things, and
cannot be based upon exceptional cases.
ld. (emphasis added).
9. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
10. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908). See also Goessaert v.
Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), upholding state statutes prohibiting women from
particular occupations, such as the Michigan statute which forbade women from
working as bartenders unless they were the wife or daughter of the male owner.
11. White, Women in the Law, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1051 (1967).
12. Id. at 1054-57.
13. Id. at 1062-64.
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the law review. 14  The number of women holding federal district
court or court of appeals judgeships can be counted on two hands.
And, of course, no woman has ever been appointed to the United
States Supreme Court.
Sexism is also part and parcel of the American jury system.
The "peers" selected to sit in judgment in American trials are
overwhelmingly male, and they, of course, carry with them
through the trial and into the jury room the biases and prejudices
of their sex.' 5 Trial counsel have traditionally attempted to com-
bat bias on the jury through jury selection procedures, particularly
through voir dire examination of prospective jurors. Yet even in
this vital phase of the proceedings, sex-based prejudices and
stereotypes may dominate the trial lawyer's activities. Henry
Rothblatt, a well-known criminal defense attorney, advises the
following:
Common sense, combined with some appreciation of
how the female mind works, will go a long way toward de-
ciding the sexual composition of your jury. Women jurors are
desirable if the defendant happens to be a handsome young
man. Since the jury tends to try the attorney as well, a
woman juror is called for if you fit that description. Women
are desirable if the principal witness against the defendant is
a woman. Women are somewhat distrustful of other women.
An all-male jury is preferred where the defendant is a
woman. The elderly-grandmother type is also usually to be
desired over a younger woman. The occupation of a wo-
man's husband is important, too, for generally she will feel
and think in the same manner as her husband.1
Even Charles Garry, who established his ability to conduct a pene-
trating voir dire in the trials of Black Panthers, and who is one
of the acknowledged masters of the art of probing racial prejudices
14. Id. at 1072-73.
15. On the pervasiveness of sex-based prejudice and its effect on women in
other areas of society, see generally SISTERHIOOD Is POWERFUL, supra note 3;
WOMAN IN SEXIST SOCIETY (Gornick & Moran eds. 1971). On the effects of sex-
ist attitudes on men, see M. FASTEAU, THE MALE MACHINE (1974). See also
references cited in note 3 supra. For a particularly insightful analysis of a fre-
quently discussed topic, see Weisstein, Why We Aren't Laughing . . . Any More,
Ms., Nov., 1973, at 49, 50 (emphasis in original):
Think of all the cartoons and comic strips you've read. Now think of
all those that didn't include a silly club lady, a domineering mother-in-
law, a wife who can't drive a car or balance a checkbook, a sex-starved
spinster, a spendthrift wife, a chorus girl trying to trap a rich man, a
teen-ager trying to trap a boyfriend, a fat Mexican or Indian woman
trailing behind her man, a maid who dominates her employers, a
nurse/stewardess/secretary/victim.
Are there any left? Are you laughing?
16. H. ROTILATT, SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES IN THE TRIAL OF CRIMINAL
CASES 23 (1961).
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of prospective jurors, has been observed to depend on coquettish
innuendo to accomplish his purposes:
With middle-aged women Garry was especially effective.
A handsome, impeccably dressed man (the journalistic cliche
was "dapper"), approaching 60 but looking years younger,
only he himself seemed innocent of the seductive, even
overtly sexual, nature of his approach. Thus a standard
Garry opener for females was, "Has anything I have asked
the other jurors today triggered off something in the crevices
of your conscious or unconscious mind that you would like
to tell me about?"'17
This article will discuss one method of combating sexism in
one area of the law: the use of voir dire in isolating, confronting,
and "minimizing" sex-based discrimination in jury trials. The dis-
cussion will focus on criminal trials, primarily because the case law
has, for the most part, developed out of criminal rather than civil
proceedings, and will generally assume a defense counsel's point
of view. Many of the issues raised, of course, are equally appro-
priate in the civil trial context, and many of the techniques will
be equally useful to prosecuting attorneys.
The article will first consider the influences of sex-based
prejudices in jury trials. Next will follow an examination of the
constitutional standards applied by the United States Supreme
Court in sex discrimination cases. This discussion will serve as
general background for the discussion on the right to voir dire on
sex-based attitudes and prejudices. The article will then present
an extensive discussion on combating sexism through voir dire,
including the nature of voir dire and the general law governing
its conduct, the federal law on the right to an extensive voir dire,
and the significant developments in California law. Finally, the
article will present a series of sample questions which will aid trial
counsel in uncovering sex-based prejudices during voir dire. The
chief objectives of the article will be to summarize the legal foun-
dations for effective voir dire technique, to explore extensions of
existing doctrines, and to suggest practical methods by which sex-
based prejudices may be rooted out and dealt with in jury trials.1 8
17. Blauner, Sociology in the Courtroom: The Search for White Racism
in the Voir Dire, in MInIMIZING RACIsM iN JuRy TRIALs 55 (A. Ginger ed. 1969).
18. For the purposes of this article, it will be assumed that sex-based biases
and prejudices affect everyone in the courtroom, to a greater or lesser degree, just
as they affect everyone in society. The "degree" of influence of such biases is
the critical issue, of course, but it cannot be seriously disputed that every adult
male harbors some stereotyped ideas or attitudes towards women which affect his
perceptions of events-and evidence. See references cited in notes 3 & 15 supra.
Biases against women may also be held by women jurors: to some extent,
therefore, the trial attorney must be as concerned about the hostilities of womenjurors as about those of men. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that pro-
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II. INFLUENCES OF SEX-BASED PREJUDICES IN JURY TRuALs
When they have been sensitive to the issue of sex-based prej-
udice in jury trials, lawyers have generally framed the problem
in terms of bias against a female party to an action. The task
of the trial counsel, then, is to help the client directly by seeking
to expose and overcome sex-based prejudices against her which
may affect the jury's verdict. This is clearly an appropriate and
important function for trial counsel to assume. There are at least
three other ways, however, in which sexism infects jury trials, and
diligent counsel will be cognizant of these factors as they affect
the client in a more roundabout way. Each of them, it may be
noted, may have a significant effect on the jury's verdict regardless
of whether the actual client is female or male.
First, sex-based prejudice may affect the way in which the
jury perceives female witnesses in a case. If jurors are permitted
to indulge in stereotyped assessments of women witnesses-
"women are emotional, excitable, and don't pay close attention to
details"-without such stereotypes being exposed and confronted,
the credibility of the witnesses may suffer substantially. This
problem is set into sharp focus when a female witness is called
by the defense to contradict the testimony of a male police
officer, frequently the arresting officer. Though jurors seldom
admit it on voir dire, they generally tend to place an extra degree
of credibility on the testimony of a police officer. When, in addi-
tion, the police officer is a man, and is contradicted by a female
defense witness, the problems for defense counsel are com-
pounded, and the burden is greater on counsel to expose sex-
based stereotypes before they can harm the client's interests, such
as on voir dire.
Second, sex-based prejudice may affect the jury's perceptions
of the case when the attorney representing one party is a woman.
It is true that jurors' prejudices toward women lawyers may be
a two-edged sword: certainly many jurors, particularly men, will
feel that a woman has no business being in court, that she should
be at home "where she belongs," that she can't possibly be a good
attorney. Many jurors, particularly working-class people, may feel
threatened in their self-image or sense of self-esteem by the sight
of a highly-educated professional woman appearing in court to
conduct a trial. On the other hand, sexist attitudes of male jurors
spective women jurors will neither carry the range of stereotypes concerning
women that men will, nor cling to those stereotypes as intensely as men, particu-
larly in the face of persuasion and contrary evidence. Moreover, nascent feelings
of sisterhood (for sister defendants, attorneys, witnesses and jurors) may be de-
veloped to a considerable degree under the voir dire questioning of skilled and
sensitive trial counsel.
[Vol. 15
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may be turned to the female attorney's advantage through those
same vaguely seductive techniques which have proved so useful
to some trial attorneys." To be sure, there are strong arguments
for and against such courtroom demeanor, but it cannot be denied
that sexist attitudes may strongly affect the proceedings whenever
a female attorney works on a trial. As with female witnesses,
therefore, it is clearly in her client's interests for the woman lawyer
to expose and confront sex-based prejudices as early in the case
as possible.
Third, sex-based attitudes may affect the jury's verdict with
respect to women jurors themselves. Since women are generally
excused from jury duty more readily than men,20 the woman juror
is likely to find few other members of her sex on the jury. If
her perceptions of the case are somewhat different from those of
the male members of the jury, she may find herself isolated and
representing a distinctly minority viewpoint.2' While it is difficult
to foresee this situation before the trial begins, the trial attorney
may have some idea whether the issues, the witnesses, the client,
or even the attorney are more likely to find sympathy with a
woman juror than with a man. In such a situation, the trial
attorney may want to bolster the woman juror against what may
be pressures from other jurors to "cave in." 2  This may be done,
for example, through voir dire questions emphasizing the rights
of women and the independence of their personal judgment: "Do
you believe that women have a right to be free of discrimination
based on their sex? Do you think that women always vote the
way their husbands vote? If you were the lone holdout on the
jury after hours of deliberation, would you be influenced by the
fact that the other eleven jurors disagreed with you? '23 Similar
19. Women attorneys and law students differ sharply on the advisability of
using such techniques to combat sex-based prejudices and stereotypes, since they
may only feed the preconceptions which a prospective juror holds.
20. KANOWITZ, supra note 3, at 28-31; M. MEAD & F. KAPLAN, AMERICAN
WOMEN 242 (1965); see Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S. Ct. 692 (1975), discussed in
text accompanying notes 53-56 infra.
21. Empirical studies of small group decision-making processes indicate that
jurors in the minority on the first ballot are likely to be influenced by the size
of the majority arrayed against them. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE
AMmucAN JuRY 462-63, 488-89 (1966).
22. E.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1973, at 8, col. 3.
23. Note the difference between this question and the following: "Supposing
you were the only juror on the panel that was a woman and the other eleven mem-
bers were men, would there then be a jury of eleven people or a jury of twelve?"
When plaintiff's attorney asked this question in a civil trial, defense counsel
jumped up and declared that plaintiff's attorney had insulted the juror, and de-
manded that plaintiff's counsel apologize. The question offended many women
on the jury panel. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S.
CAL. L. Rav. 503. 527 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Broeder].
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questions may also be asked of male jurors to force them to con-
front sexist prejudices against female members of the jury.
III. CHALLENGING SEX DISCRIMINATION-FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has
reassessed its ancient and obviously antiquated notions of the
"proper" status of women in society. In 1971, in Reed v. Reed,2"
the Court was confronted with an Idaho statute which stated that
"males must be preferred to females" among persons otherwise
equally entitled to administer the estate of one who died intestate.
The Court was urged by the female appellant to declare that dis-
criminations based solely upon sex, like those based upon race,
are inherently "suspect," and thus only justified when promoting
a "compelling" governmental interest.2" In response, the Court
abandoned the paternalistic notions of women's inferiority and
"dependence" evident in Bradwell and Muller, but it nevertheless
refused to declare sex a "suspect" ground of classification. In-
stead the Court held that the statute was arbitrary and irrational
and thus violated traditional equal protection requirements.
26
The test applied by the Court, however, was somewhat dif-
ferent from the "traditional" equal protection standard. The
Court held that the distinction between the sexes embodied in the
statute did not have "a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation, 27 taking its standard from a 1920 decision,
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia.28 Although the Court was clearly
not applying "strict scrutiny" to classifications based upon sex, its
requirement of a "substantial" relation between statutory classi-
fication and legislative goal did appear to constitute a somewhat
higher standard than the traditional "rational relationship" test. 9
The next case reaching the Court which involved a classifica-
tion scheme based upon sex was Frontiero v. Richardson." The
issue before the Court concerned the right of a female member
of the armed forces to claim her spouse as a "dependent" for the
purposes of obtaining increased quarters allowances and medical
and dental benefits on an equal footing with male members.
24. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
25. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
26. 404 U.S. at 76-77.
27. Id. at 76.
28. 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
29. Compare the Royster Guano Co. standard with that used in McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
30. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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Under the applicable statutes,' a serviceman was able to claim
his wife as a "dependent" without regard to whether she was in
fact dependent upon him for any part of her support, but a service-
woman was not able to claim her husband as a "dependent" unless
he was in fact dependent upon her for over one half of his sup-
port.82
The plurality opinion, representing the views of Justices
Brennan, Douglas, White and Marshall, confronted the issue of
sex discrimination directly:
There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such
discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of a "romantic
paternalism" which, in practical effect, put women not on a
pedestal, but in a cage.38
The opinion noted that during much of the 19th century, "the
position of women in our society was, in many respects, compar-
able to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes.
Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or
bring suit in their own names, and married women traditionally
were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey property or to
serve as legal guardians of their own children."8 4  Although the
position of women in society has improved in recent decades,
it can hardly be doubted that, in part because of the high visi-
bility of the sex characteristic, women still face pervasive, al-
though at times more subtle, discrimination in our educational
institutions, on the job market and, perhaps most conspicu-
ously, in the political arena. 5
Since sex is "an immutable characteristic determined solely by the
accident of birth," a characteristic which "frequently bears no
relation to ability to perform or contribute to society," the opinion
stated that classifications based upon sex, like those based upon
race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently "suspect" and will
be subjected to "strict judicial scrutiny."' 0 Finding that the statu-
tory scheme served no purpose other than "administrative con-
venience," the opinion held that the requirement that a service-
woman prove the dependency of her husband was unconstitu-
tional.87
31. 37 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403 (1970); 10 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1076 (1970).
32. Appellant Sharron Frontiero challenged the statutory scheme under the
due process clause of the fifth amendment: "'[W]hile the Fifth Amendment con-
tains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is "so unjustifi-
able as to be violative of due process."' Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168
.... Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499....." 411 U.S. at 680.
33. Id. at 684.
34. Id. at 685.
35. Id. at 686.
36. Id. at 686-88.
37. Id. at 690.
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There was no majority opinion in Frontiero. Justice Stewart
concurred in the judgment of the plurality, on the ground that the
statutory scheme worked an "invidious" and therefore unconstitu-
tional discrimination, citing only Reed v. Reed as authority. 8
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Blackmun also con-
curred in the judgment, on the same authority, but stated that it
would be premature to hold sex to be a "suspect classification"
inasmuch as the equal rights amendment, which would resolve the
issue, was concurrently involved in the ratification process in the
state legislatures. 9 Justice Rehnquist dissented.
Despite the lack of a majority ruling, Frontiero was clearly
a victory for women's rights advocates and hopefully a harbinger
of a new constitutional analysis in sex discrimination cases.4 0 In
subsequent decisions, however, the Court has followed an erratic
path. In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,41 the Court
struck down rules in Cleveland, Ohio, and Chesterfield County,
Virginia, which required public school teachers to take unpaid
maternity leaves five and four months, respectively, before the
expected childbirth, and which, in Cleveland, prohibited the
teacher from returning to work until her child was at least three
months old. The Court's analysis was very different from that in
Reed or Frontiero. It found that the mandatory maternity leave
provisions created an irrebuttable presumption that pregnant
teachers were physically incompetent to carry on their teaching
duties as early as several months before the expected childbirth,
regardless of the actual physical condition of an individual teacher
in the same stage of pregnancy. Similarly, the Cleveland manda-
tory waiting period for teachers returning to work created an
irrebuttable presumption of physical incompetency until three
months after the birth of the child. Noting that "'permanent irre-
buttable presumptions have long been disfavored under the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,' "42 the
Court accordingly held the rules unconstitutional. There was no
discussion in the Court's opinion of the fact that male teachers with
temporary physical disabilities were subject to no similar manda-
tory leave requirements, or of the fact that only women, after all,
can become pregnant.
The Court's next opinion in a sex discrimination case was
38. Id. at 691.
39. Id. at 691-92.
40. Several lower courts adopted the "strict judicial scrutiny" standard when
evaluating sex discrimination cases. See, e.g., Johnston v. Hodges, 372 F. Supp.
1015 (E.D. Ky. 1974).
41. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
42. Id. at 644, quoting Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973).
[Vol. 15
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even more curious. In Kahn v. Shevin,43 the Court considered
a Florida law which provided for a $500 annual tax exemption
for widows but offered no analogous benefit for widowers. The
Court was well aware of the practical economic problems facing
women in America:
There can be no dispute that the financial difficulties
confronting the lone woman in Florida or in any other State
exceed those facing the man. Whether from overt discrimi-
nation or from the socialization process of a male dominated
culture, the job market is inhospitable to the woman seeking
any but the lowest paid jobs . . . . The disparity is likely
to be exacerbated for the widow. While the widower can
usually continue in the occupation which preceded his spouse's
death, in many cases the widow will find herself suddenly
forced into a job market with which she is unfamiliar, and in
which, because of her former economic dependency, she will
have fewer skills to offer.44
Although the statute clearly made a distinction based solely upon
sex, the application of "strict judicial scrutiny," as indicated by the
plurality in Frontiero, would have resulted in the overturning of
the statute. Justice Douglas, evidently loathe to upset the tax
benefit to widows, wrote the opinion of the Court, upholding the
statute as meeting the Reed v. Reed test. Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and White, who had formed the Frontiero plurality with
Douglas, dissented on the ground that a stricter test should be
applied.
In the next sex discrimination case considered by the Court,
the gradual retreat from Frontiero became a rout. In Geduldig
v. Aiello,45 with Justice Stewart writing the majority opinion, the
Court held that the California disability insurance system, which
excludes from the definition of covered "disability" certain disabil-
ities resulting from pregnancy, did not violate the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws. The Court did not
apply either the Reed or Frontiero test. Instead, it reasoned that
the challenged exclusion was justified because coverage of preg-
nancy disabilities would be expensive to the insurance system and
therefore would disrupt the economic foundation of the program:
"Particularly with respect to social welfare programs, so long as
the line drawn by the State is rationally supportable, the courts
will not interpose their judgment as to the appropriate stopping
point."40 In fact, the Court denied that the case presented a ques-
tion of sex discrimination:
43. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
44. Id. at 353-54 (footnotes omitted).
45. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
46. Id. at 495.
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The California insurance program does not exclude anyone
from benefit eligibility because of gender but merely removes
one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of compen-
sable disabilities. While it is true that only women can be-
come pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classi-
fication concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification like
those considered in Reed, supra, and Frontiero, supra. Nor-
mal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition
with unique characteristics. Absent a showing that distinc-
tions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect
an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex
or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include
or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such
as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any
other physical condition.47
Subsequent opinions have similarly failed to provide any
definitive framework of analysis. In Schlesinger v. Ballard,48
plaintiff Robert Ballard, a Navy lieutenant with more than nine
years of active service as a commissioned officer, had failed, for
the second time, to be promoted to the grade of lieutenant com-
mander, and was therefore subject to mandatory discharge under
the applicable statute.49 He brought suit on the ground that if
he had been a woman, he would have been entitled to 13 years
of commissioned service before being subject to mandatory dis-
charge for lack of promotion.50 The Court, again with Justice
Stewart writing for the majority, upheld the statutory scheme. It
concluded that since the participation of women in combat and
most sea duty is statutorily restricted, Congress may "quite
rationally" have believed that women officers, with less opportun-
ity to compile service records comparable to their male counter-
parts, needed a longer tenure period than male officers if they
were to receive "'fair and equitable career advancement pro-
grams.' ,51 In thoroughly embracing this "protective" legislation,
the Court did not consider, ostensibly because Ballard did not
challenge, the validity of the pivotal statute, which provides that
"women may not be assigned to duty in aircraft that are engaged
in combat missions nor may they be assigned to duty on vessels
of the Navy other than hospital ships and transports."52
Six days after Ballard was decided, the Court issued its
opinion in Taylor v. Louisiana." Billy J. Taylor had been con-
47. Id. at 496-97 n.20.
48. 95 S. Ct. 572 (1975).
49. See 10 U.S.C. § 6382(a) (1970).
50. See id. § 6401(a) (1970).
51. 95 S. Ct. 572, 577-78 (1975).
52. Id. at 577. See 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1970).
53. 95 S. Ct. 692 (1975).
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victed of aggravated kidnapping by a Louisiana jury. Under
applicable state law, a woman was not eligible for jury service un-
less she filed a written declaration of her desire so to serve.
Though the jury selection system did not disqualify women for jury
service, it was conceded that in practice the number of women
called for jury service was grossly disproportionate to the number
of eligible women in the community. There were no women, for
example, in the venire from which Taylor's jury was selected.
The Court struck down the jury selection scheme, but not on equal
protection grounds. Instead, it held that the system violated an
aspect of Taylor's sixth and fourteenth amendment right to an im-
partial jury in criminal prosecutions: that is, his right to a jury
drawn from a "representative cross section of the community." 54
In a ruling potentially as significant as the holding in the case,
the Court also ruled that Taylor had standing to raise the issue
of the absence of women from the venire. Relying upon Peters
v. Kill,"5 in which the Court had held that a white defendant had
standing to challenge a jury selection process which systematically
excluded black people, the Court stated that Taylor had standing
to raise the claim that he had been deprived of the kind of jury
to which he was constitutionally entitled, even though he was not
a member of the excluded class.
In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,5" the Court confronted another
equal protection issue. Plaintiff Stephen Wiesenfeld challenged
a provision of the Social Security Act57 which made benefits based
on the earnings of a deceased husband and father covered by the
Act payable to the widow and to the couple's minor children, but
which made benefits based on the earnings of a deceased wife
and mother covered by the Act payable only to the minor children
and not to the widower. The Court stated that the "gender-based
distinction made by § 402(g) is indistinguishable from that invali-
dated in Frontiero v. Richardson . . .,"1 and declared that an
"archaic and overbroad" generalization 
. . . "not tolerated
under 'the Constitution" underlies the distinction drawn by§402(g), namely, that male workers' earnings are vital to the
support of their families, while the earnings of female wage-
earners do not significantly contribute to their families' sup-
port.5a
54. See Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970); Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443 (1953); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946); Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
55. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
56. 95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)(1970).
58. 95 S. Ct. at 1230.
59. Id. at 1231 (footnote omitted). In a footnote the Court added:
See the observations in Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 689, n.23, that in view
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The opinion is long on legislative history and short on constitu-
tional doctrinal analysis, holding only the following:
Since the gender-based classification of § 402(g) cannot
be explained as an attempt to provide for the special prob-
lems of women, it is indistinguishable from the classification
held invalid in Frontiero. Like the statutes there, "[b]y pro-
viding dissimilar treatment for men and women who are...
similarly situated, the challenged section violates the [Due
Process] Clause." Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971).6 0
Finally, in Stanton v. Stanton"' the Court ruled on the consti-
tutionality of the Utah statute providing that the period of minority
for males extends to age 21, but for females only to age 18. Ap-
pellant Thelma Stanton had been granted support payments for
her son and her daughter in a previous divorce decree, but under
Utah law the payments for her daughter were discontinued when
she reached the age of 18. She sued for support payments for
her daughter until the daughter reached the age of 21.
The Utah Supreme Court upheld the statute on the basis of
what it termed "old notions":
"that generally it is -the man's primary responsibility to pro-
vide a home and its essentials" . . . ;that "it is a salutary thing
for him to get a good education and/or training before he
undertakes those responsibilities" . . . ; that "girls tend gen-
erally to mature physically, emotionally and mentally before
boys"; and that "they generally tend to marry earlier" ....6
The United States Supreme Court stated, "We find it unneces-
sary in this case to decide whether a classification based on sex
is inherently suspect," 8 and held that the statute could not be jus-
tified even if the Utah court's contentions were true:
No longer is the female destined solely for home and the rear-
ing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and
the world of ideas. Women's activities and responsibilities
are increasing and expanding. Coeducation is a fact, not a
rarity. The presence of women in business, in the professions,
in government and, indeed, in all walks of life where education
is desirable, if not always a necessary antecedent, is apparent
and a proper subject of judicial notice. If a specified age of
of the large percentage of married women working (41.5% in 1971),
the presumption of complete dependency of wives upon husbands has lit-
tle relationship to present reality. In the same vein, Taylor v. Louisiana,
95 S. Ct. 692 (1975), observed that current statistics bely "the pre-
sumed role in the home" of contemporary women. 95 S. Ct. at 700
n.17.
Id. at n.11.
60. 95 S. Ct. at 1236.
61. 95 S. Ct. 1373 (1975).
62. Id. at 1375-76.
63. Id. at 1377.
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minority is required for the boy in order to assure him parental
support while he attains his education and training, so, too, it
is for the girl. B4
The Court therefore, held that the provision did not withstand the
equal protection attack, there being no valid distinction between
male and female which could be drawn.65
The Wiesenfeld and Stanton opinions demonstrate the unset-
tled nature of the Court's constitutional analysis regarding sex dis-
crimination. Wiesenfeld, authored by Justice Brennan, fre-
quently compares the challenged provision to those invalidated in
Frontiero, which was written by the same Justice. In its ultimate
citation to Reed v. Reed, however, the opinion indicates that the4Cstrict judicial scrutiny" favored by the Frontiero plurality has not
been adopted by a majority of the Court, and it is unclear whether
statutory distinctions based upon sex require only a traditional "ra-
tional" basis, or, after Reed v. Reed, "rationality plus." In Stan-
ton, authored by Justice Blackmun, the court explicitly states that
it has not decided upon the appropriate constitutional standard.
Thus the exact constitutional status of sex discrimination,
clearly an important issue in determining the right to an extensive
voir dire on prejudice and bias, remains unresolved. What the
Court has shown is that in particular circumstances it will look be-
yond the myths of female dependence, economic subservience,
and incompetence of the Bradwell and Muller era, and make an
empirical determination whether legislative presuppositions re-
garding the behavior and role of women have any basis in present
reality. 6 In this regard the Court appears to be less concerned
with whether the literal terms of a challenged statutory provision
make a distinction based upon gender, and more with the practical
consequences of that distinction for women, particularly in terms
of economic detriment and benefit, opportunity for full participa-
tion in society, and integrity of the total statutory scheme. This
is certainly not the equivalent of subjecting sex-based classifica-
tions to "strict judicial scrutiny," but it is a significant consideration
in developing strategies for combating sex discrimination in jury
trials.
IV. COMBATING SEX-BASED PREJUDICES THROUGH VOIR DIRE
A. Voir Dire: Definitions, Procedures, and General Principles
Before being selected for service in a particular case, pro-
spective jurors are subjected to voir dire examination. "Voir
64. Id. at 1378 (citation omitted).
65. Id. at 1379.
66. See note 59 supra.
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dire" means "to speak the truth, '8 7 and consists of a series of
questions designed to uncover bias or prejudice among the poten-
tial jurors. Voir dire procedure is generally governed by statute,
and may vary somewhat in different jurisdictions. Questions may
be directed at individuals, or at a group of prospective jurors, or
at the entire jury panel. Individuals may be examined in isolation
or with the other members of the jury panel in the courtroom.
Questioning may be conducted by the judge, or by trial counsel,
or both. In the federal courts, the conduct of the voir dire is gov-
erned by the provisions of section (a) of Rule 24 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure:
The court may permit the defendant or his attorney and
the attorney for the government to conduct the examination
of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination.
In the latter event the court shall permit the defendant or his
attorney and the attorney for the government to supplement
the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper or
shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such additional
questions by the parties or their attorneys as it deems proper.
The conduct of the voir dire is thus left to the discretion of the
judge. In practice, the majority of trial judges in federal courts
conduct the voir dire themselves, allowing counsel to submit to
them proposed questions.6 8
During the voir dire prospective jurors may be challenged
by the judge or by one of the attorneys. Two types of challenges
may be exercised by trial counsel: challenges for cause and per-
emptory challenges. Challenges for cause may be made on the
grounds of "actual" bias or of "implied" bias. Actual bias is pres-
ent where the prospective juror admits to a state of mind that pre-
vents him from being impartial. Implied bias is present where
an inference of partiality can be drawn from the relationship be-
tween the prospective juror and a party or an element of the case.
Peremptory challenges may be exercised by a party for any reason
whatsoever. The number of challenges for cause is unlimited,
while the number of peremptory challenges is governed by statute
or local procedure.69
67. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1746 (1968). Others have defined it, perhaps
more cynically, as "to see what is really being said." LA RAZA DEFENDANTS
AND Vom DiRE: A MANUAL To HELP COMBAT RACIST JuRiEs 1 (1972) (publica-
tion of the National Lawyers Guild, San Francisco, Calif.) [hereinafter cited as
LA RAZA DEFENDANTS].
68. 62.7 FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a).
Notably, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association at its 1975
mid-year meeting adopted the following Resolution:
Resolved, That the American Bar Association supports the concept of
voir dire by counsel as a matter of right in federal civil and criminal
cases.
69. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
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The significance of the voir dire was recognized in the United
States at least as early as the trial of Aaron Burr.7 ° In one of
the first American cases holding that a person having an opinion
on a case is disqualified from sitting as a juror, Chief Justice Mar-
shall, sitting on the circuit, discussed voir dire at some length. His
statements on the nature of bias establish a foundation for requir-
ing an extensive voir dire:
Why do personal prejudices constitute a just cause of chal-
lenge? Solely because the individual who is under their in-
fluence is presumed to have a bias on his mind which will
prevent an impartial decision of the case, according to the
testimony. He may declare that notwithstanding these prej-
udices he is determined to listen to the evidence, and be gov-
erned by it; but the law will not trust him. . . . He will lis-
ten with more favor to that testimony which confirms, than
to that which would change his opinion; it is not to be
expected that he will weigh evidence or argument as fairly
as a man whose judgment is not made up in the case. 71
In 1892 the Supreme Court, in Lewis v. United States,72 explicitly
emphasized the importance of the voir dire: "The right of chal-
lenge comes from the common law with the trial by jury itself,
and has always been held essential to the fairness of trial by
jury. 73
Reynolds v. United States74 was the first comprehensive dis-
cussion of voir dire by the Supreme Court. The Court's decision
established most of the fundamental principles governing the voir
dire. It presented a definition of the "impartial" juror required
by the sixth amendment: "A juror to be impartial must, to use
the language of Lord Coke, 'be indifferent as he stands un-
sworn.' "7 The decision established the permissible scope of the
voir dire: "To make out the existence of [bias], the juror who
is challenged may be examined on voir dire, and asked any ques-
tions that do not tend to his infamy or disgrace. '76  It sets forth
70. One of the complaints against British rule in America was that, in crim-
inal trials of political opponents, the policy of the Crown was "to secure jurors
favorable to the Crown (Tories) and to deny defendants an effective opportunity
to ferret out biased jurors." Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire of
Jurors: A Constitutional Right, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 290, 294 (1972). Previ-
ously, in Massachusetts Colony for example, the 1760 Jury Selection law had re-
quired "that the venire be chosen by a town meeting, thereby allowing the accused
to thoroughly examine the character and biases of prospective jurors." Id.
71. United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 50 (Cir. Ct. Va. 1807). Cf. United
States v. Callender, 25 Fed. Cas. 239 (Cir. Ct. Va. 1800).
72. 146 U.S. 370 (1892).
73. Id. at 376.
74. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
75. Id. at 154.
76. Id. at 155 (emphasis added).
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a minimum burden of proof for a party challenging a prospective
juror: a challenge for cause "must be founded on some evidence,
and be more than a mere impression. 77  The decision dealt at
some length with the test to be applied in determining whether
a prospective juror should be dismissed for bias:
Chief Justice Marshall, in Burr's Trial (1 Burr's Trial 416)
states the rule to be that, "light impressions, which may fairly
be presumed to yield to the testimony that may be offered,
which may leave the mind open to a fair consideration of the
testimony, constitute no sufficient objection to a juror; but
that those strong and deep impressions which close the mind
against the testimony that may be offered in opposition to
them, which will combat that testimony and resist its force,
do constitute a sufficient objection to him." The theory of
the law is that a juror who has formed an opinion cannot be
impartial. 78
Further, the decision established a standard for appellate review:
"The finding of the trial court upon that issue [that is, the chal-
lenge to the juror] ought not to be set aside by a reviewing court,
unless the error is manifest."79  Finally, the facts of the case pre-
sented an early touchstone against which judges could measure
acceptable bias in a prospective juror.
Reynolds, a Mormon, had been charged with violation of the
Utah bigamy statute. His defense was that the multiple marriage
was authorized under his religion. During voir dire, when the
district attorney asked one of the veniremen whether he had
"formed or expressed any opinion" as to the guilt or innocence
of the defendant, the man replied, "I believe I have formed an
opinion."' 0  The trial judge then took over the questioning. In
response to questions, the juror repeated that he had formed an
opinion, not based upon anything which had occurred in court.
The juror asserted, however, that his opinion would not influence
his verdict in the case. In response to questions from the defend-
ant, the juror stated that he had not "expressed" an opinion, but
that he had "formed" one. The court refused to excuse the juror
for cause, stating that the defendant had not met his burden of
showing that the juror could not be impartial, inasmuch as the ju-
ror only "believed" he had formed an opinion."' Reynolds was
convicted. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. It at-
tempted to distinguish Reynolds' situation from one in which the
juror should have' been excused for cause: "If a positive and de-
77. Id.
78. Id. at 155-56 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 156.
80. Id. at 147.
81. Id. at 156.
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cided opinion had been formed, he would have been incompetent
even though it had not been expressed." '82 There may be little
usefulness in a distinction between an "opinion" and a "positive
opinion," but the clear effect of the ruling was to give the trial
judge considerable discretion in his decision whether to excuse
prospective jurors for cause.
Several other general principles concerning the voir dire have
become firmly established. The defendant has no constitutional
right to have the voir dire conducted either by himself or by coun-
sel, at least in federal court,"' and the refusal by the trial judge
to allow personal voir dire of the prospective jurors is not an abuse
of discretion. 4  Moreover, it is technically improper to use the
voir dire to "condition" the panel members by presenting to them
aspects of a party's case, rather than to inquire into the qualifica-
tions and competency of the prospective jurors, and it is not an
abuse of discretion for the court to limit counsel's questioning
when such improper purpose is evident.85 Where there is a sig-
nificant possibility that jurors have been exposed to potentially
prejudicial material, however, such as pre-trial publicity, there is
a clear obligation on the part of the trial judge to have prospective
jurors examined thoroughly in order to ascertain the effects of
such material."6
B. Smoking Out Bias-And Getting Burned: The Case Law
In the last forty years, the United States Supreme Court has
considered the issue of bias of individual jurors several times. In
United States v. Wood, 87 the Court held that the eligibility of gov-
ernment employees for jury service in criminal cases does not con-
travene the fifth or sixth amendments, despite the fact that the
government, as the prosecution, is a party in the proceedings. The
Court said that such employment alone could not be taken as evi-
dence of bias in favor of the prosecution: "Impartiality is not a
technical conception. It is a state of mind. For the ascertainment
of this mental attitude of appropriate indifference, the Constitu-
82. id. at 157 (emphasis added).
83. Hamer v. United States, 259 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1958); Pasehen v. United
States, 70 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1934).
84. Bonness v. United States, 20 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1927); Kurczak v. United
States, 14 F.2d 109 (6th Cir. 1926).
85. See, e.g., Strickland v. Perry, 244 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1957).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Bryant, 471 F.2d 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1112
(1973), 410 U.S. 957 (1973). United States v. Colabella, 448 F.2d 1299 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 929 (1972); Patriarca v. United States, 402
F.2d 314, 317-18 (Ist Cir. 1968), cert. denied 405 U.S. 1048 (1972).
87. 299 U.S. 123 (1936).
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tion lays down no particular tests and procedure is not chained
to any ancient and artificial formula. '18
The Court extended the Wood holding in Dennis v. United
States,"9 ruling that although federal employees were required to
undergo a "loyalty" investigation to determine whether there was
any evidence that they were "disloyal" to the United States, such
employees would not be disqualified for jury duty in Smith Act
prosecutions of members of the Communist Party. The Court af-
firmed the defendants' convictions and rejected the contention
that the President's "Loyalty Order" would influence their deci-
sion whether to acquit or convict the Communists, relying on the
jurors' assertions on voir dire that they would not be affected by
the Order, and noting quixotically that "the Loyalty Order is not
directed solely against Communists, and that the crime of which
petitioner was convicted is not a crime peculiar to Communists."" °
In the lower court decision the Second Circuit had held that the
trial judge was under no obligation to ask prospective jurors spe-
cific questions designed to probe their beliefs as to the teachings
of the Communist Party, and that it was no abuse of discretion
for the trial judge to refuse to excuse a juror when evidence was
presented that he had made a speech indicating his extreme hostil-
ity to Communism. 1
Some Supreme Court decisions evidence more concern for
defendants' objections to prospective jurors, though they do not
alter the general tenor of the law. Prior to Wood and Dennis,
for example, the Court had held in Crawford v. United States92
that a conviction for conspiracy to defraud the United States must
be reversed because a juror who was an employee of the federal
government was not excused for cause. The Court indicated that
if there was doubt as to the impartiality of the juror, the challenge
should be allowed. 98
88. Id. at 145-46.
89. 339 U.S. 162 (1950).
90. Id. at 169.
91. 183 F.2d 201, 228 (2d Cir. 1950). See also United States v. Mesarosh,
116 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Pa. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 352 U.S. 1 (1956).
92. 212 U.S. 183 (1909).
93. The Court said:
Bias or prejudice is such an elusive condition of the mind that it is most
difficult, if not impossible, to always recognize its existence, and it might
exist in the mind of one (on account of his relations with one of the
parties) who was quite positive that he had no bias, and said that he
was perfectly able to decide the question wholly uninfluenced by any-
thing but the evidence. The law therefore most wisely says that with
regard to some of the relations which may exist between the juror and
one of the parties, bias is implied, and evidence of its actual existence
need not be given.
The position of the juror in this case is a good instance of the wis-
dom of the rule. His position was that of an employ6 [sic] who re-
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Even taking into account the irrationality of the anti-Com-
munist feeling in the United States during the 1950's, to some ex-
tent reflected in the Dennis opinion, Crawford would appear to
have little vitality today. One case in which the Court did hold
that juror bias warranted reversal of a conviction was Remmer v.
United States. 4 There, in a prosecution for evasion of income
tax, evidence presented by the defendant indicated that a person
not connected to the defendant in any way told one of the jurors
that the juror might make a "profitable deal" with the defendant.
Without the defendant's knowledge and without telling the juror
the results, the FBI subsequently made an investigation of the in-
cident. The Court held that the juror's "freedom of action as ajuror" was affected and remanded the case for a new trial. 5
The Supreme Court has also held, in Witherspoon v. Illi-
nois,96 that disqualification for cause of veniremen having consci-
entious scruples against or opposed to capital punishment, without
their stating that they would automatically vote against the imposi-
tion of such punishment no matter what the trial would reveal,
violated the defendant's rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury
secured by the sixth and fourteenth amendments. 7 The Court
stated:
It is, of course, settled that a State may not entrust the deter-
mination of whether a man is innocent or guilty to a tribunal
"organized to convict. . . ." It requires but a short step
from that principle to hold, as we do today, that a State may
not entrust the determination of whether a man should live
or die to a tribunal organized to return a verdict of death.98
Cases in the lower courts provide more dramatic examples
of the kinds of bias which fail to shock judicial sensibilities. In
Commonwealth v. DePalma99 the defendant, an Italian, was
charged with murder. One of the prospective jurors, on voir dire,
said of Italians, "As a race, they are too much for murder." The
trial judge refused a defense motion to excuse the prospectivejuror for cause; he was seated as a member of the jury, and the
defendant was convicted. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
ceived a salary from the United States. . . It need not be assumed
that any cessation of that employment would actually follow a verdict
against the Government. It is enough that it might possibly be the case,
and the juror ought not to be permitted to occupy a position of that na-
ture to the possible injury of a defendant on trial, even though he should
swear he would not be influenced by his relations to one of the parties
to the suit in giving a verdict.
212 U.S. at 195-96.
94. 350 U.S. 377 (1956).
95. Id. at 381.
96. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
97. Id. at 518.
98. Id. at 521.
99. 110 A. 756 (Pa. 1920).
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held that the judge's ruling was not an abuse of discretion.10
Equally outrageous was State v. Russell,' 01 where the defendant
was a Mexican and a prospective juror stated on voir dire, "I don't
like the Mexican race." The Supreme Court of Nevada held that
the denial by the trial judge of defendant's challenge for cause
was proper and did not constitute error.'
0 2
Some lower courts have set limits on the degree of prejudice
they will allow, but they have evidently been willing to do so only
in the most flagrant cases. For example, in People v. Ortiz'01 a
prospective juror had made the statement prior to voir dire,
"They better not take me on that jury, or I will hang that Mexican
"_.104 On voir dire, however, he failed to disclose any racial
prejudice or ethnic bias. The juror was seated and the defendant
convicted of murder. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the
juror's statement was evidence of prejudice and the conviction
must be reversed. 0' In United States v. Chapman,'0 a condem-
nation proceeding, the Tenth Circuit held that a juror who had
previously testified as an expert witness for the same defendant
landowner in a suit by the government to condemn land for the
same project was not an "impartial" juror, and the trial court's re-
fusal to sustain the government's challenge for cause was rever-
sible error. 10 7  In Virgin Islands v. Bodle,10 8 a prosecution for
rape, one of the prospective jurors failed to disclose on voir dire
that his sister had been raped and murdered three years before,
despite careful questioning during voir dire. The juror was sub-
sequently seated and the defendant was convicted. The Third
Circuit held that the defendant's constitutional right to an impar-
tial jury had not been violated, but that it would reverse the con-
viction "in the exercise of its supervisory powers." 0 9
The reported opinions, of course, represent only the most
dramatic examples of racial prejudice or other bias affecting
100. Id. at 758.
101. 220 P. 552 (Nev. 1923).
102. 220 P. at 553. See also United States v. Crosson, 462 F.2d 96 (9th Cir.
1972), where the defendant was charged with burning the American flag. On
voir dire one of the jurors stated, "When they burn the flag, they hurt me because
they hurt my country." Id. at 103. The juror was excused for cause, but the trial
judge refused to grant a mistrial on the ground that the "inflammatory statement
in the presence of the other jurors" prejudicially infected the jury. The defendant
was convicted. The Ninth Circuit upheld the conviction, finding no reversible
error. Id. at 104.
103. 320 Ill. 205, 150 N.E. 708 (1926).
104. Id. at -, 150 N.E. at 712. The published opinion does not reveal what
was specifically indicated by "-."
105. Id.
106. 158 F.2d 417 (10th Cir. 1946).
107. Id. at 421.
108. 427 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1970).
109. Id. at 534.
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jurors. Indeed, voir dire examination has generally been found,
both by trial lawyers and by empirical researchers, to be extremely
ineffective in exposing bias or prejudice in prospective jurors. 110
The reasons for this are evident. Many people are simply not
aware of the prejudices they harbor, and those who are aware of
such prejudices will seldom admit to them in open court. Further-
more, even under the best of circumstances, the types of challen-
ges available to defense attorneys suffer other drawbacks which
hamper their usefulness.
The challenge for cause may be exercised by one of the par-
ties, but it is ultimately the judge who must decide whether to
excuse the juror. As the reported cases demonstrate, trial judges
cloak jurors with a strong presumption of impartiality, particularly
when a juror asserts under oath that he or she can lay aside any
feelings of bias and view the case with an open mind. Even when
sexist attitudes are elicited on voir dire, it is likely that such atti-
tudes will not be recognized as prejudicial by the predominantly
male judiciary.
The restricted effectiveness of the peremptory challenge de-
rives from the limited number of peremptories allowed. And
given the pervasiveness of sex-based prejudice in our society, it
may be just as likely that the next prospective juror will be just
as biased as the one excused.11 Moreover, appellate courts us-
ually hold that if all defense peremptory challenges have not been
used, the defense will be deemed to have accepted the jury and
waived errors in juror selection."' The conscientious defense at-
torney thus may be hamstrung between Scylla and Charybdis,
weighing each prospective juror who might be excused by per-
emptory challenge against the remaining members of the venire,
yet fearful that objections to the jury will be ignored on appeal
if all peremptories are not used.
The task of combating bias in juror selection is particularly
difficult in view of the subtlety of the prejudices held by people
in society. Prejudice causes a person to react in a preconceived
manner toward a particular person or situation, and to close his
or her mind to facts and opinions that do not fit a preconceived
stereotype. Prejudice also produces feelings of hostility or supe-
110. See, e.g., Broeder, supra note 23, at 505.
111. In addition, just as in situations where racial prejudice is "acceptable" in
the community, a defense attorney may jeopardize the defendant's interests sub-
stantially by challenging prospective jurors on the grounds of sexist biases, since
many of the remaining veniremen will likely share such prejudices.
112. E.g., People v. Boorman, 142 Cal. App. 2d 85, 297 P.2d 741 (1956);
United States v. Colabella, 448 F.2d 1299 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
929 (1972). But see United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1970);
People v. Stockard, 219 N.W.2d 68 (Mich. 1974).
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riority toward people who look, think, or act differently from ones-
self. Few people will admit to prejudices when asked directly,
"Do you have any biases or attitudes which would prevent you
from giving the accused a fair trial?" Upon further examination,
however, occasionally people will admit that they have had "unfor-
tunate" experiences with members of other races, that they feel
uneasy in the company of certain racial minorities, that they think
that a woman's place is in the home, that they would not like to
have a woman as their boss, that they see nothing wrong with re-
ferring to an adult female as a "girl." General questions will not
bring these attitudes to the surface: only through extended, pa-
tient, careful questioning may sexist attitudes, like racial preju-
dices, be isolated, confronted, and dealt with.
Questioning of prospective jurors, even if it is extensive, will
generally have limited effectiveness if the entire venire is ques-
tioned as a group. Membership in the group acts as a protective
blanket for prospective jurors and a screen from questioning at-
torneys, providing safety in numbers, diffusing any pressure to vol-
unteer individual statements, and discouraging personal replies.
Extensive voir dire of individual prospective jurors is required if
deeply-held prejudices are to be exposed. 113  Individual question-
ing allows the defense attorney and the defendant physically to
confront the prospective juror, eyeball to eyeball;" 4 it allows
113. There may be some advantages to group voir dire:
The presence of many potential jurors and the tension of the un-
certainties faced by all concerned can create excitement, contagion and
sometimes candor. For example, in the Camden 28 case, one juror hon-
estly stated that "the defendants are guilty"; the reaction among the ju-
rors was open and pronounced, and several thereafter expressed the same
opinion, although none had before. Group voir dire also allows one to
view the jurors' reactions to what is happening and is more susceptible
to use of the voir dire as an educational event.
Bush, Cohen & Shulman, Voir Dire Rights, in THE JuRY SYSTEM: NEW
METHODS FOR REDuciNo PREJuDicE 28 (The National Jury Project & The Na-
tional Lawyers Guild 1975) [hereinafter cited as THE JuRy SYsTEM].
114. Occasionally, the results of such direct confrontation are startling. While
defending Erica Huggins, a member of the Black Panther Party, in a Connecticut
trial, attorney Catherine Roraback developed the tactic of asking questions while
standing directly behind Ms. Huggins, thus forcing the prospective juror to look
at the defendant and to see the friendly and respectful relationship between attor-
ney and client. After one prospective juror had repeatedly asserted that she could
be fair in response to questions from the judge and three lawyers, attorney Rora-
back moved behind her client:
Miss Roraback asked: "Is there anything about your attitude or experi-
ences we haven't covered in all of these questions that would make you
unable to listen to the evidence in this case and reach an unbiased ver-
dict?"
For the first time the witness looked directly at the defendant. With
pure hate in her eyes, she spat out, "She's guilty!"
The judge, startled, said, "What did you say?"
"She's guilty!"
The juror was promptly excused for cause.
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attorneys to ask open-ended questions, which require the juror to
reveal something of his or her own personality and attitudes; and
it allows the defense to make intelligent use of its peremptory
challenges.
Generally, trial judges do ask at least some questions of indi-
vidual jurors, though these are often confined to questions as to
residence, occupation, and other relatively innocuous topics.
Ideally, voir dire should be conducted for individual jurors in thejudge's chambers, a method necessitated in some of the Watergate
trials by the massive pretrial publicity. When individual jurors are
questioned in front of the entire venire, there is a problem of su-
perficially fulfilled expectations: the other members of the venire,
when questioned subsequently, are able to adjust their responses
to the answers which the reactions of the judge and the parties
indicate are acceptable. 115 In order to elicit fresh responses,
questioning attorneys must come up with new questions, or at least
questions newly phrased, for each prospective juror.
Finally, even if questioning is extensive and directed at in-
dividual jurors, voir dire will be of limited effectiveness if the
questioning is conducted solely by the judge.116 The trial attorney
has prepared the case, knows what the evidence will be, and is
sensitive to the issues which may trigger bias or prejudice. The
trial judge knows much less and often nothing whatsoever about
the case. Moreover, the trial judge who decides to conduct voir
dire himself must assume the additional burden of reviewing pos-
sibly hundreds of proposed voir dire questions and determining
which are proper, which are relevant but should be rephrased, and
which are improper. Each denial or rephrasing by the court may
constitute an issue for appeal. Most importantly, it is unlikely that
a judge will conduct the kind of careful, probing inquiry neces-
sary to smoke out biased attitudes.
A judge not only must be fair, but also must preserve the
appearance of fairness. Yet few judges show any inclination to
engage in a searching, even potentially hostile, questioning of
prospective jurors, regardless of the importance of voir dire to the
particular defendant. Indeed, such conduct by the judge, the per-
son holding pre-eminent power in the courtroom, may well be mis-
understood by prospective jurors and prove extremely counterpro-
ductive to the judicial process. Trial counsel, on the other hand,
has both the knowledge and the motivation to conduct an effec-
Ginger, What Can Be Done to Minimize Racism in Jury Trials, 20 J. PUB. L
427, 437-38 (1971).
115. See THE Juay SYSTEM, supra note 113, at 28.
116. In federal court, the most common procedure is that the attorneys submit
lists of questions to the trial judge who reads them to the prospective jurors.
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tive voir dire, and is expected by everyone, including the prospec-
tive jurors, to provide "zealous" representation. 1 7
C. The Right to an Effective Voir Dire on Sex-Based Preju-
dices-Federal Law
1. Attorney-conducted voir dire. Under Rule 24(a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial judge may in his
discretion conduct the voir dire himself or permit the attorneys
to question prospective jurors," 8 although in practice, trial
judges conduct the voir dire themselves in a majority of the fed-
eral districts. 119 Under certain circumstances, as where wide-
spread pretrial publicity or potential racial bias is involved, some
courts have indicated that the defense has the right to conduct the
voir dire in order fully to explore hostile attitudes held by poten-
tial jurors.12 Nevertheless, appellate courts rarely reverse trial
judges on this issue except in very unusual cases. 2 '
2. Scope of the voir dire questioning. The right to an ex-
tensive voir dire was recognized by the United States Supreme
Court as early as 1878.122 The Court in Reynolds v. United
States declared that a prospective juror may be asked "any ques-
tions that do not lead to his infamy or disgrace,"' 23 but, as we
have seen, later courts have been less enthusiastic about protect-
ing defendants from biased jurors. In Dennis v. United States,
for example, the Supreme Court maintained: "In exercising its
discretion, the trial court must be zealous to protect the rights of
an accused,' 24 but in refusing to reverse the Second Circuit's de-
117. See ABA, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 7: "A Lawyer
Should Represent A Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law." See gen-
erally Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire, supra note 70.
118. See text accompanying notes 68-69 & 80-85 supra.
119. The Jury System in the Federal Courts, 26 F.R.D. 409, 466 cited in THE
JURY SYSTEM, supra note 113, at 27.
120. See THE JURY SYSTEM, supra note 113, at 27, and cases cited therein;
Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 637-38 (9th Cir. 1968); Coppedge
v. United States, 272 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Johnson v. Beto, 337 F. Supp.
1371, 1379 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 8 CrL 2094 (Pa. Sup.
Ct. Oct. 9, 1970). See generally Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966);
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
In United States v. McNeil, 357 F. Supp. 342 (N.D. Cal. 1973), a black anti-
war activist was charged with failing to keep his local draft board informed of
his current address and refusal to report for induction. The trial judge denied
the defendant's motion to permit oral and direct voir dire of prospective jurors
by counsel, but at trial the judge himself questioned the prospective jurors exten-
sively on the areas pressed by the defendant, particularly racial biases and the
war in Vietnam.
121. THE JURY SYSTEM, supra note 113, at 27.
122. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); see also text accompany-
ing notes 74-82 supra.
123. 98 U.S. at 155 (emphasis added).
124. 339 U.S. 167, 168 (1950).
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cision the Court itself was considerably less than zealous.' 25  On
the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has
held that judges must exercise a "punctilious regard for a suspi-
cion of prejudice," and, in the case of doubt, rule in favor of the
defendant. 2 " And the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has
explicitly condemned the practice of putting a question to jurors
en bloc, declaring that such a question, "with an absence of re-
sponse, achieves little or nothing by way of identifying, weighing,
or removing any prejudice ....
The cases discussing specific voir dire questions generally fall
into one of two categories: those involving questions about various
aspects of the proceedings, and those relating to parties at the trial.
Thus, as to the former, questions exploring the prospective jurors'
biases and attitudes towards the crimes with which the defendant
is charged, for example, must be allowed.
3. Biases toward proceedings. It will be recalled that in
Dennis v. United States,"8 the Supreme Court held that federal
employees were not per se disqualified from sitting as jurors in
Smith Act cases, despite the fact that they were subject to a Presi-
dential "Loyalty Order." In Morford v. United States,"29 however,
the Court held that the refusal by the trial judge to allow voir dire
questions to federal employees as to the influence of the "Loyalty
Order" and whether it would bias the prospective juror in favor
of the prosecution was reversible error. In Lurding v. United
States," the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that in
a prosecution for income tax evasion for bookmaking, it was rever-
sible error for the trial judge to refuse to allow the defendant's
attorney to ask on voir dire whether any prospective jurors were
opposed to the operation of bookmaking establishments in prin-
ciple or on moral grounds. The court noted that counsel "was
entitled to probe for the hidden prejudices of the jurors."''
Finally, in Napoleone v. United States,"' the Third Circuit held
that in a prosecution for falsely pretending to be an investigator
for the Veteran's Administration, it was reversible error for the
trial judge to refuse to ask on voir dire whether the prospective
jurors had any particular repugnance towards liars or lying.
Voir dire questions pertaining to prospective jurors' prior ex-
125. tSee text accompanying notes 89-91 supra.
126. United States v. Chapman, 158 F.2d 417, 421 (10th Cir. 1946).
127. Patriarca v. United States, 402 F.2d 314, 318 (Ist Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 393 U.S. 1022 (1969).
128. 339 U.S. 162 (1950).
129. 339 U.S. 258 (19.50).
130. 179 F.2d 419 (6th Cir. 1950).
131. Id. at 421.
132. 349 F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1965).
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periences with incidents similar to those alleged in the current case
must also be allowed. Thus, in United States v. Poole,1 3 the
Third Circuit held that in a prosecution for bank robbery, the re-
fusal by the trial judge to ask potential jurors, "Have you or any
member of your family been a victim of a robbery or other
crime?" was reversible error. In Photostat Corp. v. Ball,'8 4 an
action for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident,
members of the jury panel were asked whether they had previ-
ously been involved in an automobile accident. Owing to a mis-
understanding of the question, members of the venire failed to
disclose that they had, in fact, been involved in accidents previ-
ously. The Tenth Circuit held that regardless of the lack of intent
to deceive on the part of the prospective jurors, the defendant's
ability to exercise peremptory challenges was prejudicially re-
stricted, thus necessitating a new trial.1 8
Questions may also be asked as to prospective jurors' atti-
tudes towards witnesses in the case. It is well-established that the
refusal of a trial judge to allow the question whether prospective
jurors would give greater weight to the testimony of a police of-
ficer because he is a police officer is reversible error, 8 ' although
the defendant is not entitled to ask whether jurors would believe
the police officer's word over that of the defendant.' 37  Similarly,
it is reversible error for the trial judge to refuse to ask whether
any members of the jury panel are related to the government's
witnesses in the case.' 8
Even questions involving legal issues in the case may be nec-
essary if the issues are ones which may provoke bias or prejudice.
In United States v. Robinson,139 the trial judge refused to ques-
tion the jurors regarding self-defense, stating, "I don't want to in-
ject any legal defenses into a case before the jury has heard the
evidence."' 4 °  The court of appeals, however, disapproved of the
judge's ruling, even though the government had contended that
133. 450 F.2d 1082 (3d Cir. 1971).
134. 338 F.2d 783 (10th Cir. 1964).
135. Id. at 787. See also United States ex rel. DeVita v. McCorkle, 248 F.2d
1 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957), in which the court held that
where a prospective juror in a robbery case neglected to disclose on voir dire that
he had been a recent robbery victim, but such information came to light long after
the trial and subsequent appeals, habeas corpus must be granted because of preju-
dice to the defendant.
136. Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Sellers v. United
States, 271 F.2d 475 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Chavez v. United States, 258 F.2d 316
(10th Cir. 1958).
137. Chavez v. United States, 258 F.2d 816, 819 (10th Cir. 1958).
138. Cook v. United States, 379 F.2d 966, 971 (5th Cir. 1967).
139. 475 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
140. Id. at 380.
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the evidence ultimately offered might not justify an instruction on
self-defense:
If the issue is one on which jury attitudes should be probed
on voir dire to assure a fair trial by an impartial jury, this
strength of our system should not be scuttled merely because,
on relatively infrequent occasions, a planned defense is unex-
pectedly foreclosed or abandoned. And the problem can be
contained by accompanying the voir dire with a cautionary
instruction explaining the purpose of the questioning and in-
forming the jurors that the matters discussed are not in evi-
dence and are not to be considered during their deliberations.
This approach is fortified by the right of the defense counsel
to present his approach to the jury before trial, in the opening
argument.14'
4. Biases toward parties. With respect to questions regard-
ing the parties, the defendant must not only be allowed to ask
questions regarding any relationships between prospective jurors
and the parties and their attorneys, but must also be allowed to
explore associational ties between prospective jurors and witnesses
who will be called. Thus, in United States v. Lewin,'42 the Sev-
enth Circuit held that it was reversible error for the trial judge
to refuse to ask prospective jurors if they had associations with
a civic organization or a newspaper which provided most of the
investigative work for the government in the case. The govern-
ment's chief witnesses at trial were a paid investigator for the civic
organizatiaon and a reporter working for the newspaper.' 43
Sometimes the questions relating to attitudes toward the par-
ties in the case include inquiries as to religious beliefs. For ex-
ample, in United States v. Daily,14 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that a defendant accused of failing to report
for induction into the armed forces was entitled to ask if the jurors
would be prejudiced against him because he was a Jehovah's Wit-
ness.
Judges must also allow voir dire questioning regarding prej-
udice against parties on account of their nationality. In Kuzniak
v. Taylor Supply Co.,145 a diversity case involving severe injuries
sustained in a traffic accident, plaintiffs Mstislaw and Elisabeth
Kuzniak were Austrian nationals residing in the state of Michigan.
141. Id.
142. 467 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1972).
143. Id. at 1139. See also Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775 (3d Cir.
1965), holding that in a suit for personal injuries from a fall on a sidewalk it
was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to refuse to ask prospective jurors
about their prior associations with an insurance company.
144. 139 F.2d 7 (7thCir. 1943).
145. 471 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1972).
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The court refused to allow voir dire as to possible prejudices pro-
spective jurors might harbor against Austrian nationals stemming
from Austria's alignment with Germany in World War 11.14 6 The
court of appeals held that the ruling was prejudicial error, and that
the prejudicial effects of the ruling were not ameliorated by the
trial judge's general questioning of potential jurors as to whether
they knew of any reason why they could not give the plaintiffs
a fair trial.14 7
5. Biases based on race. The cases involving questions re-
lating to racial prejudice constitute a line of authority that is clear-
cut and, for the purposes of this article, most significant.
The leading United States Supreme Court case on the issue
is Aldridge v. United States. 4 ' The trial judge had refused to
ask prospective jurors whether they had any racial prejudices
which would prevent their giving an impartial verdict in the prose-
cution of a black for the murder of a white man. Defense coun-
sel had good reason to urge the question, since at a previous trial
in the case a white woman juror had stated that the fact that the
defendant was black and the deceased was white may have influ-
enced her.'4' The Court held that such refusal was reversible
error. It cited state cases from Florida, Mississippi, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, New York, and Missouri holding that such
questions must be allowed, and concluded: "The practice of per-
mitting questions as to racial prejudice is not confined to any sec-
tion of the country, and this fact attests the widespread sentiment
that fairness demands that such inquiries be allowed."'150 More-
over, it noted that the "right to examine jurors on the voir dire
as to the existence of disqualifying state of mind has been upheld
with respect to other races than the black race, and in relation
to religious and other prejudices of a serious character,"' 15 citing
cases from Texas, California, and Washington. Finally, in re-
sponse to the government's contention that such a question would
inject racial issues into a case in which none otherwise existed,
the court declared:
The argument is advanced on behalf of the government
that it would be detrimental to the administration of the law
in the courts of the United States to allow questions to jurors
as to racial or religious prejudices. We think that it would
be far more injurious to permit it to be thought that persons
entertaining a disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve
146. Id. at 703.
147. Id.
148. 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
149. 283 U.S. at 310.
150. Id. at 313.
151. Id.
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as jurors and that inquiries designed to elicit the fact of
disqualifications were barred. No surer way could be devised
to bring the processes of justice into disrepute.' 5 2
Several lower courts extended the Aldridge ruling, character-
istically quoting extensively from the opinion. In Frasier v.
United States, 58 the First Circuit reversed a conviction for making
false statements on a "Loyalty Certificate for Personnel in the
Armed Forces," on the ground that questions as to racial prejudice
had been refused by the trial judge. The court noted that
Aldridge applied even though the case did "not involve a crime
of violence such as is likely to arouse racial prejudice."' 4 And
in King v. United States, 5 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit agreed with the Frasier court that Aldridge
was not limited to capital crimes or even crimes of violence, and
held that the failure of the trial judge to allow questions as to ra-
cial prejudice was plain error, cognizable on appeal even if not
brought to the attention of the trial court under Rule 52(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In United States v. Gore,'56
the Fourth Circuit likewise reversed a conviction for possession
of stolen property, where the trial judge had refused to allow ques-
tions on racial prejudice, agreeing that Aldridge was not confined
to its facts. The court pointed out that the Supreme Court had
relied in Aldridge on a Florida case, Pinder v. State, 5 7 in which
both the defendant and the deceased were black, and the case
apparently had no racial overtones at all.'58
In United States v. Carter,'59 the Sixth Circuit held that the
refusal of the trial judge to interrogate prospective jurors as to ra-
cial prejudice was reversible error, despite substantial evidence of
the defendant's guilt. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit, in Smith v. United States,160 reversed the convictions of a
black man and woman charged with passing forged checks be-
cause the trial judge had refused to allow prospective jurors to
answer defense counsel's questions as to whether they belonged
to the Ku Klux Klan, White Citizen's Council, or similar organiza-
tions. The appellate court held that such refusal constituted re-
versible error.' 6 1 Similarly in United States v. Robinson,'62 where
152. Id. at 314-15.
153. 267 F.2d 62 (lst Cir. 1959).
154. Id. at 66.
155. 362 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
156. 435 F.2d 1110 (4thCir. 1970).
157. 27 Fla. 370, 8 So. 937 (1891).
158. United States v. Gore, 435 F.2d 1110, 1111-12 (4th Cir. 1970).
159. 440 F.2d 1132 (6th Cir. 1971).
160. 262 F.2d 50 (4th Cir. 1958).
161. Id. at 51. Cf. United States v. Bowe, 360 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966), in
which the court said that it was "entirely proper" in a prosecution of Black de-
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the trial judge had also refused to ask jurors questions going to
racial prejudice, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit re-
versed, holding that the judge had abused his discretion "in refus-
ing to ask any of the proferred questions relating specifically to
racial prejudice. 163
If there was any doubt as to the basis for the requirement
that jurors be questioned as to racial prejudices or to the force
of Aldridge, it was dispelled by the Supreme Court's recent de-
cision in Ham v. South Carolina.' Ham, a young black man, was
charged with possession of marijuana. His basic defense was that
law enforcement officials were "out to get him" because of his
local civil rights activities. At trial he requested that the judge
inquire as to possible racial prejudices among prospective jurors.
The trial judge refused, Ham was convicted, and his conviction
was affirmed by a divided South Carolina Supreme Court.0 5
In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the United States Su-
preme Court held that the refusal of the trial judge to inquire as
to racial prejudices of prospective jurors deprived Ham of the "es-
sential demands of fairness" and denied him a fair trial in violation
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
Court relied squarely on Aldridge.166
Cases following Ham have extended its holding. In United
States v. Booker,' the court of appeals held that the trial judge
committed reversible error by refusing to question prospective
jurors as to possible racial prejudice against the black defendant,
and that the error was not rendered harmless either by the fact
that the evidence of the guilt was allegedly overwhelming or by
the fact that five of the jurors ultimately seated were black:
For if even one member of the jury harbors racial preju-
dice against the accused, his right to trial by an impartial jury
is impaired . . . . Ham v. South Carolina . ..persuades
us that. . . we should reverse without attempting to appraise
the actual likelihood of prejudice to this appellant.' 08
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v.
Robinson, 6 ' held that similar conduct by the trial judge was re-
fendants, charged with conspiracy to blow up the Statue of Liberty, to ask the
single Black venireman whether the fact that he was a member of the same race
as the defendants would prejudice his views in their favor, or dispose him to vote
for conviction to disassociate himself from their views.
162. 466 F.2d 780 (7th Cir. 1972).
163. Id. at 782.
164. 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
165. Id. at 524-25.
166. Id. at 526-27.
167. 480 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1973).
168. Id. at 1311.
169. 485 F.2d 11,57 (3d Cir. 1973).
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versible error even though the questions suggested by counsel dealt
with racial prejudice toward potential witnesses rather than the
defendant: "We think any such fine distinction between prejudices
against witnesses based upon race and prejudice against the de-
fendant based upon race would be pettifogging."' 70
6. United States v. Dellinger.171 One other recent federal
decision merits particular attention. United States v. Dellinger,
concerning the trial of the so-called Chicago Seven for riots during
the 1968 Democratic Convention, establishes the strongest argu-
ment yet posited by courts for the right to an extensive voir dire.
There the Seventh Circuit held that it was prejudicial error for
the trial judge to refuse to allow voir dire questions in three "basic
areas" of the case: protest against United States involvement in
Vietnam, the "conflicts of values represented by the so-called
youth culture-hippies, yippies and freaks-in contrast with the
more traditional values of the vast majority of the commun-
ity, 1 72 and the conflict of values "symbolized in the confrontation
between the city police and the demonstrators.' ' 3
Three aspects of the decision are particularly significant.
First, the three "basic areas" of required voir dire represent a
broad focus of inquiry, considering the specific charges of incite-
ment to riot and conspiracy to cross state lines with intent to incite
to riot. The court's rationale was that jurors' attitudes toward the
Vietnam war and the yippies and hippies would very likely affect
their views of the case.' 74 Second, the court held that refusal to
allow the requested voir dire was an improper restriction on the
defendants' right to peremptory challenge. 175  Many of the cases
on right to voir dire involve challenges for cause, but the court
in Dellinger held that the defendants must be allowed to obtain
adequate information for the proper use of peremptories: "If this
right is not to be an empty one, the defendants must, upon re-
quest, be permitted sufficient inquiry into the background and atti-
tudes of the jurors to enable them to exercise intelligently their
peremptory challenges.' 76 Finally, the court held that denial of
the right to such extensive voir dire is prejudicial per se. Quoting
Swain v. Alabama,'77 the court held that the "denial or impair-
ment" of the right of peremptory challenge "is reversible error
without a showing of prejudice.''178
170. Id. at 1159.
171. 472 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1972).
172. Id. at 369.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 368-69.
175. Id. at 370.
176. Id. at 368.
177. 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
178. 472 F.2d at 368 (emphasis added).
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7. Voir dire on sex-based prejudice. Although Dellinger
appears to go further than other cases in establishing the right to
an extensive voir dire, it is only a logical extension of existing law,
applied with a scrupulous intention to protect the rights of the ac-
cused. The standard established in Reynolds v. United States still
prevails: the defendant must be allowed to probe for those
"strong and deep impressions which close the mind against the
testimony which may be offered in opposition to them."'179 Thus
the critical question is whether the subject matter of the question-
ing goes to such "strong and deep" impressions.
Aldridge, Ham and their progeny indicate that prejudice as
to race is so powerful and affecting, so pervasive in society and
so detrimental to a defendant's right to a fair trial, that it will be
considered as the type of "strong and deep" bias that will vitiate
a judicial proceeding, even if specific prejudice is not shown. Ac-
cordingly, voir dire as to racial prejudice is a constitutional re-
quirement of a fair trial.
Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that prejudice as
to sex is also powerful and affecting, pervasive and detrimental
to a woman's ability to obtain fair treatment with regard to dis-
position of her economic interests and societal role.'" The courts
have apparently not considered the specific question whether
such prejudice, when it infects members of the jury, also viti-
ates a defendant's right to a fair trial. As a factual matter, there
can be little doubt that sex-based prejudices may "close the mind"
to the evidence offered in the case and thereby deny the defend-
ant a fair and impartial decision.' As a legal matter, the ques-
tion is still unresolved. It would appear that if the courts con-
sidered the refusal to question jurors as to biases on account of
sex with the same "strict judicial scrutiny" that is applied to mat-
ters involving discrimination as to race, then inquiries as to sex-
based prejudices would certainly be required as an "essential de-
mand of fairness.' 8 2
The Supreme Court, however, has not applied the same con-
stitutional test to sex discrimination as it has to racial discrimina-
tion. On the other hand, the Court has shown great interest and
concern for the effects of sex-based discrimination on the interests
and lives of women. Indeed, the Court as a whole appears to
be specifically concerned with the practical disadvantages foisted
179. 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878) (emphasis added).
180. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
181. See text accompanying notes 18-23 & 110 supra.
182. It appears to be a matter of virtual consensus that sex discrimination cases
will be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny if the Equal Rights Amendment be-
comes law. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring, joined by Burger, CJ., and Blackmun, J.).
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upon women on account of their sex, and four justices would sub-ject all issues of sex discrimination to the strictest scrutiny."5 3 In
this regard, voir dire inquiry as to sex discrimination would appear
to occupy a very different status than other potentially biasing cir-
cumstances, such as the defendant's having a beard. 4
183. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (Brennan, Douglas,
Marshall and White, J.J.).
184. In Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973), the defendant also ap-
pealed on the ground that the trial judge refused to allow him to ask voir dire
questions concerning possible prejudice due to the fact that he wore a beard. On
this issue, the Supreme Court stated:
While we cannot say prejudice against people with beards might not have
been harbored by one or more of the potential jurors in this case, thisis the beginning and not the end of the inquiry as to whether the Four-
teenth Amendment required the trial judge to interrogate the prospectivejurors about such possible prejudice. Given the traditionally broad dis-
cretion accorded to the trial judge in conducting voir dire, Aldridge v.
United States, supra, and our inability to constitutionally distinguish pos-
sible prejudice against beards from a host of other possible similar preju-
dices, we do not believe the petitioner's constitutional rights were vio-lated when the trial judge refused to put this question. The inquiry as
to racial prejudice derives its constitutional stature from the firmly estab-lished precedent of Aldridge and the numerous state cases upon which
it relied, and from a principal purpose as well as from the language of
those who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment [i.e., to prohibit the
States from invidiously discriminating on the basis of race]. The trialjudge's refusal to inquire as to particular bias against beards, after hisinquiries as to bias in general, does not reach the level of a constitutional
violation.
409 U.S. at 527-28.
The implications of this statement are as yet unclear, particularly when it
is contrasted with the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Dellinger. Certainly it does
not establish the broad right to voir dire which Dellinger might foster. Yet future
cases raising issues with respect to voir dire may turn much more on their facts
than on mechanical applications of precedent. Those arguing for a right to ex-
tensive voir dire will take note of several salient aspects of the Ham decision.
First, the Court's epistle on beards is neither an extensive discussion of the issue
nor a determination necessary to the holding in the case. Having reversed on
the issue of inquiry as to racial prejudice, the Court had no need to deal with
the beard question in order to grant relief to a defendant whose due process rights
had obviously been violated. The precedential effect of its rather superficial treat-
ment may thus reflect the peripheral position of the issue in the case.
Second, Ham's beardedness was not a "basic area" of his case, even to the
extent that the Vietnam War, the youth culture, and confrontation between dem-
onstrators and police were relevant to the prosecution of the Chicago Seven for
the Democratic Convention riots in Dellinger. Thus the Court's "inability to con-
stitutionally distinguish possible prejudice against beards from a host of other pos-
sible similar prejudices" is really beside the point. The constitutional issue is not
the "ability" to lay down an absolute rule regarding beards, or hair length, or even
race or sex, since any of these may in fact give rise to prejudice among jurors;
rather, it is the court's determination to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial,
and thus to allow inquiry whenever it is reasonably likely that jurors may fall
victim to what the Court in Reynolds called "those strong and deep impressions
which close the mind against the testimony that may be offered in opposition to
them." Circumstances can certainly be imagined in which voir dire questioning
concerning a defendant's beard might be constitutionally required: for example,
if there were widespread publicity in a murder case that witnesses saw a bearded
man fleeing from the scene of the crime. By stating that the refusal to inquire
as to beards "does not reach the level of a constitutional violation" the Court
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Thus, although refusal to inquire on voir dire as to sex-based
prejudice would not be held to be constitutionally unfair without
any showing of prejudice, voir dire on racial prejudice notwith-
standing, it would appear that if the defendant made a showing of
how sex-based prejudice would affect the jury's determinations, then
the "essential demands of fairness" may well require such an in-
quiry. The defendant's burden, then, would be to make the requisite
showing. Not every trial would be affected by sex-based prejudices,
but, as noted earlier,18 sex-based biases may well affect a trial
where the defendant is a woman, where the defense attorney is a
woman, where female witnesses will testify in opposition to male
witnesses, or where there are women on the jury. Similarly, the
appellate cases on voir dire questioning indicate that voir dire on
sexism may well be required, for example, where the complaining
witness in a criminal charge (for example, rape) is a woman, or
where a civil suit involves sex discrimination (for example, civil
rights suit alleging sex discrimination in employment).
These considerations apply particularly to voir dire to elicit
challenges for cause. Dellinger's emphasis on the right to exer-
cise peremptory challenges "intelligently" provides another ra-
tionale, independent from but complementary to such arguments,
for requiring voir dire on sex-based prejudices. As the Supreme
Court emphasized in Swain v. Alabama, 86 peremptory challenges
are exercised arbitrarily, without stated reasons, without inquiry,
and without being subject to the control of the court-and may
properly be used when partiality in a prospective juror is real or
only imagined.'1 7 Unless the sex-based biases of prospective jurors
are explored on voir dire, peremptory challenges will be exercised
through guesswork rather than "intelligence."
Nor can it be claimed that questions on sex-based prejudices
will inject an element into the proceedings which did not previ-
ously exist. Faced with such a contention the Supreme Court in
Aldridge commented:
We think it would be far more injurious to permit it to be
merely begs the question without referring to constitutional standards of fairness
against which judicial conduct may be judged.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Court in Ham did not characterize
Ham's proposed questions in terms of his right to peremptory challenges. Thus
the strength of the Seventh Circuit's holding in Dellinger, and its implications for
voir dire in other areas, are undiminished.
See also the separate opinions in Ham of Justices Douglas and Marshall, con-
curring in part and dissenting in part, both of whom believed that the denial of
inquiry as to attitudes regarding Ham's beard was of constitutional stature. 409
U.S. at 524, 529-30.
185. See text accompanying notes 18-23 supra.
186. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
187. Id. at 218-21.
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thought that persons entertaining a disqualifying prejudice
were allowed to serve as jurors and that inquiries designed
to elicit the fact of disqualifications were barred. No surer
way could be devised to bring the processes of justice into
disrepute.188
Finally, Taylor v. Louisiana8 ' provides a legal justification
for an imperative which confronts us daily: sex-based biases
should be exposed and challenged by men, perhaps even more
so than by women, since it is, after all, primarily other men who
harbor the biases. Taylor gives standing to male parties to chal-
lenge discrimination against women which affects the fairness of
judicial proceedings. Thus, when relevant in view of the gender
of the respective witnesses, voir dire questions as to sexist attitudes
can, and should, be asked on behalf of male defendants, by male
attorneys. Such efforts may be particularly effective with male
jurors, and may even carry beneficial side effects to the men wear-
ing the black robes who control the proceedings.
D. The Right to an Effective Voir Dire on Sex-based Preju-
dices-Developments in California Law
1. Attorney-conducted voir dire. Although the right of
counsel to examine a prospective juror before challenge was estab-
fished in California law 120 years ago,' 90 the California Superme
Court, in People v. Crowe,'9' cut back significantly on the scope
of that right. At Crowe's trial, the judge refused to allow counsel
to question prospective jurors directly, but instead conducted the
examination himself with the assistance of written questions sub-
mitted by counsel. After Crowe was convicted, he appealed on
the ground that the judge had violated section 1078 of the Penal
Code, which provided:
It shall be the duty of the trial court to examine the pro-
spective jurors to select a fair and impartial jury. He shall
permit reasonable examination of prospective jurors by coun-
sel for the people and for the defendant.'92
The Court reviewed both the legislative history of this Penal
Code provision and the cases interpreting it, and emphasized that
it conferred a right to "reasonable" examination of prospective
jurors:
A reasonable examination can embrace a procedure by
which counsel submits questions to the judge who, in turn,
188. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1931).
189. 95 S. Ct. 692 (1975).
190. People v. Backus, 5 Cal. 275 (1855).
191. 8 Cal. 3d 815, 506 P.2d 193, 106 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1973).
192. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1078 (West 1970) (emphasis added).
19751
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
renders them to the prospective juror. Nothing in the legis-
lative history of section 1078 or in the cases interpreting it
compels the conclusion that direct questioning by counsel is
essential to comply with the mandate of section 1078 ....
We find no statutory prohibition of a procedure, such as that
followed in this case, which channels voir dire examination
through the trial judge. 193
The court found support for its conclusion in the existing fed-
eral procedure and recent changes in the law in other states. The
true basis for its decision, however, was clear:
We approve this method [examination by the trial
judge] of curtailing the inordinate time consumed in the
process of the selection of jurors. Thus appellate cases have
referred to "the waste of valuable court time involved" . . .
and to the "tedious, irksome and time-wasting prolongation
of individual questioning of individual jurors by one side and
then another" ... 1. 04
Noting extensive abuses by counsel on voir dire examination,'"5 the
court declared:
We conclude that direct examination by counsel has per-
verted the purpose of voir dire, and transformed the examina-
tion of jurors into a contest between counsel for the selection
of a jury partial to his cause and for the attainment of rapport
with the jurors so selected, a contest which may overshadow
the actual trial on the merits.' 96
Justice Mosk vigorously dissented from the court's opinion,
arguing that when section 1078 was originally enacted, the legisla-
ture had rejected a proposal to allow the trial judge discretion
whether to allow counsel to examine directly prospective jurors. In-
stead the lawmakers had declared that direct examination "shall"
193. 8 Cal. 3d at 824-25, 506 P.2d at 199, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
194. Id. at 825, 506 P.2d at 199, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 828, 506 P.2d at 202, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 378. In Hawk v. Superior
Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 108, 117-18, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 719 (1974), petitioner
Hawk was representing Juan Corona in a murder trial which had received wide-
spread publicity. The attorney persisted in attempts to use the voir dire to gain
sympathy for his client, despite repeated admonishments by the trial judge. For
example, he asked:
Now he [the prosecutor] made some reference to a psychologist being
here, and this man sitting here, his name is Harvey Ross from Los Ange-
les. He is a psychologist. Do you have any objection to someone com-
ing up from Los Angeles for a couple of days free of charge to Mr. Cor-
ona to help Mr. Corona select a jury because he believes Mr. Corona
is innocent?
Id. at 117-18, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 719. Hawk was held in contempt and the cita-
tion was upheld on appeal. Hawk was also cited for contempt for stating that
the exercise of a peremptory challenge by the district attorney against a prospec-
tive juror who was black was "an act of absolute white racism." This contempt
citation was also upheld. Id. at 120-21, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 720-21.
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be permitted."9 7 Justice Mosk stressed that the majority's conclu-
sion was opposed by the District Attorneys and County Counsels
Association of California, the California Public Defenders Associa-
tion, and the State Bar. He quoted the court's own decisions sup-
porting the right of counsel to question prospective jurors di-
rectly, 198 declaring that "neither respondent nor the majority can
point to a single reported criminal case in California sanctioning
total gagging of counsel."'1 9  Mosk, a former California Attorney
General, took the occasion to discuss in detail the considerations
making direct voir dire of prospective jurors vitally important, em-
phasizing that interrogation by counsel is essential to intelligent
use of peremptory challenges in that only the attorney has suffi-
cient grasp of the facts to expose biases.200 Justice Mosk also
197. 8 Cal. 3d at 834, 506 P.2d at 206, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
198. Id. at 836, 506 P.2d at 209, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 385. Justice Mosk wrote:
It is contended by the respondent on this hearing that the error of
the court, if any such error was made, in refusing to permit appellant
to examine the jurors regarding the result of the former trial and as to
their state of mind upon learning of such result, if any of them had
learned of said result, was cured by these general and special questions
asked of the jurors. We are not certain that this is the case. The ask-
ing of a general question of a juror does not always direct his attention
to all the elements which go to make up the subject matter of such ques-
tion. For example, a juror in answer to a general question might state
with perfect sincerity that he knew of no reason why he could not give
the defendant a fair and impartial trial, but upon further and more mi-
nute examination it might be shown that his conception of a fair and
impartial trial for one who had been previously tried by a jury, ten of
whom believed him guilty, differed in many material respects from that
which the law accords to all persons accused of crime. Furthermore,
he might presume the defendant innocent until proven guilty, but his
state of mind might be such that it would require less evidence to con-
vince him of defendant's guilt in a case where the latter had been previ-
ously tried with the result as above indicated, than if no previous trial
has been had. He might be in perfect accord with the law which de-
clares that a defendant shall not suffer conviction until proven guilty be-
yond all reasonable doubt, but having heard that the former jury stood
ten to two for conviction, he might not feel called upon to scrutinize
and weigh the evidence with that extreme care and caution which the
law enjoins of every juror in passing upon the life and liberty of one
against whom a criminal accusation has been made.
199. Id. at 838, 506 P.2d at 209, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 385 (emphasis added),
quoting People v. Carmichael, 198 Cal. 534, 545, 246 P. 62, 66-67 (1926).
200. 8 Cal. 3d at 839, 506 P.2d at 208, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 384. Justice Mosk
added:
In addition to its policy and precedential shortcomings, the majority
opinion will inevitably produce burdensome judicial fallout. When it is
counsel who interrogates prospective jurors he has no legal basis for
claiming dissatisfaction with the ultimate product of the selection process
in which he participated. But if the court alone interrogates veniremen,
taking some questions suggested by counsel and as here, imperiously re-
jecting others, an issue for appellate review emerges. In such circum-
stances we must recreate the scene, ascertain if the rejected queries
should have been permitted, and if so, undertake to determine whether
the exclusion was prejudicial. This is unlike the usual case in which we
weigh the prejudicial effect of evidence; here the issue is the prejudicial
inclinations of jurors. For a reviewing court, in this context, to attempt
an analysis of the juror's undisclosed predilection in order to reach a
conclusion on potential prejudice would require an omniscience which I
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mentioned a point urged by the Public Defenders Association that
denial of attorney-conducted voir dire is an infringement upon the
right to counsel, since effective use of voir dire is one mark of
a skilled practitioner.2 1' While not specifically embracing this
theory, Mosk commented:
Dependence upon the trial judge alone, even when ques-
tions are submitted to him, to effectively probe into the sensi-
tive areas of racial, cultural, and economic bias, displays
majestic indifference to the realities of contemporary urban
life. No well-intentioned but necessarily general inquiry by
the court-such as, "Will you be prejudiced against the de-
fendant because of his race or color?"-is likely to produce
anything but a negative response. Skillful counsel, by con-
trast, might well be able to reveal in a venireman a deep-
rooted aversion to unorthodox dress, speech patterns, or life
style of ghetto residents of a particular race or color. 20 2
For all the hot debate it engendered, the Crowe decision has
not resulted in the exclusion of counsel from the questioning proc-
ess. In September, 1974, with the specific intention of overcom-
ing the effect of Crowe, the legislature added to section 1078 the
following words: "such examination to be conducted orally and
directly by counsel. 120 3  To the same end, the Judicial Council
amended similar language to the rules governing the examination
of prospective jurors in the municipal and superior courts.20 4
The effect of these measures is that trial judges permit oral and
direct voir dire of prospective jurors by counsel, but keep a cau-
tious eye for the "tedious, irksome, and time-wasting" questions
criticized by the Crowe majority.
2. Scope of voir dire questioning.205 Definitions of actual
and implied bias are contained within the California Penal
Code.206 While biases implied by law arise in a number of speci-
fic statutorily defined circumstances, 07 actual bias is a state of
for one disclaim. The Court's housekeeping seal of approval on denial
of counsel's right to interrogate prospective jurors presages new bases for
appeal with which reviewing courts will be grappling in innumerable fu-
ture cases. A substantial portion of the time saved at trial may thus
be expended on appeal.
Id. at 839-40, 506 P.2d at 210, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 386 (footnotes omitted).
201. Id. at 835, 506 P.2d at 207, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
202. Id.
203. Amended by Stats. (1974), ch. 960, p. 2507, § 1. See California Jury
Selection Law, mimeographed supplement to THE JuRy SYSTEM, supra note 113,
at 3.
204. CAL. SUPER. Cr. R. 228; CAL. MUN. Or. R. 516.
205. See generally THE JURmy SYSTEM, supra note 113; California Jury Selection
Law, supra note 203; Voir Dire Examination of Jurors in Criminal Cases, 43 CAL.
ST. B.J. 70 (1968).
206. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1073-1076 (West 1970).
207. Id. § 1074 provides:
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mind which prevents the prospective juror from acting "with entire
impartiality and without prejudice to the substantial rights of either
party. 2 s08  The general test for actual bias was articulated by the
California Supreme Court in People v. Reyes:2"'
Wherever the right of trial by jury exists, the law in all
cases contemplates that each and every juror who sits in a
cause, should have a mind entirely free from all bias or preju-
dice, of any kind whatsoever. In order to arrive at the con-
dition of the person's mind, who is offered as a juror, a party
is permitted to ask of the person himself, questions, the
answers to which may tend to show whether he is prejudiced
or not in the cause, which he is about to undertake to decide.
If not satisfied with his answers, he can charge the person
offered as a juror with actual bias, and if the charge be de-
nied, its truth or falsity must be determined by triers. The
triers are to determine the fact from the testimony, and any
testimony which would lead to the conclusion that a bias
existed in the juror's mind, is competent testimony. If the
prejudice with which the juror is charged is to be determined
one way or the other, by distinctions or inferences drawn
by the Court from the questions put to the juror, there would
be no necessity for triers, where actual bias is charged. Prej-
udice is a state of mind, which, in the eye of the law, has no
degrees. If the juror is prejudiced in any manner, he is not a
fit or proper person to sit in the box. 210
The high court further discussed actual bias in People v. Riggins:
A challenge for implied bias may be taken for all or any of the following
causes, and for no other:
1. Consanguinity of affinity within the fourth degree to the person al-
leged to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the
prosecution was instituted, or to the defendant.
2. Standing in the relation of guardian and ward, attorney and client,
master and servant or landlord and tenant, or being a member of the
family of the defendant, or of the person alleged to be injured by the
offense charged or on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted,
or in his employment on wages.
3. Being a party adverse to the defendant in a civil action, or having
complained against or been accused by him in a criminal prosecution.
4. Having served on the grand jury which found the indictment, or on
a coroner's jury which inquired into the death of a person whose death
is the subject of the indictment or information.
5. Having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the
offense charged.
6. Having been one of a jury formerly sworn to try the same charge,
and whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a ver-
dict, after the case was submitted to it.
7. Having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defend-
ant for the act charged as an offense.
8. If the offense charged be punishable with death, the entertaining of
such conscientious opinions as would preclude his finding the defendant
guilty; in which case he must neither be permitted nor compelled to serve
as a juror.
208. Id. § 1073.
209. 5 Cal. 347 (1855).
210. Id.
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Such bias may consist of an opinion as to the guilt or
innocence of the accused, based upon some knowledge or in-
formation of the facts embraced in the charge or of the evi-
dence to be produced, or it may exist without such knowledge
or information, and may consist of a preconceived opinion
concerning the defendant or the prosecuting witness which
would prevent a fair consideration by the juror of the evi-
dence given or facts proven in the case. 211
With regard to specific areas of questioning, the court held
in Reyes that it was error to prohibit questioning as to affiliation
with political and other groups, in an effort to uncover prejudice
against particular racial or ethnic groups, Catholics or foreign-
ers. 12 Along the same line, in People v. Car Soy2'3 the court
held that it was reversible error, where the defendant was
Chinese, for the trial judge to refuse to allow voir dire questions
as to whether a prospective juror would take the word of a Chinese
person as soon as that of a "white man," and whether, if the de-
fendant took the stand, the prospective juror would give his testi-
mony the same credibility he would give that of a white person,
under the same circumstances. Both decisions were cited with
approval by the Supreme Court in Aldridge v. United States.
2 4
Reyes held that questions regarding political affiliations were
proper. Inquiry may also be directed to membership in any reli-
gious, social, industrial, fraternal, law-enforcement or other organi-
zation whose belief or teaching might prejudice the prospective
juror.2'5  The occupation and employment of the prospective juror
211. 159 Cal. 113, 112 P. 862 (1910). See also People v. Bennet, 79 Cal.
App. 76, 249 P. 20 (1926):
Hence, to a party whose rights are to be committed to the arbitra-
ment of a jury, it is always of singular importance that he should be
convinced that those individuals who are to compose the jury will be
governed . . . by the evidence . . . [and] the law . . . . mhe field of
inquiry in the ascertainment of whether a prospective juror is or is not
freed from actual or implied bias is and should be broad. In other
words, such inquiry should not be so restricted as to prevent a thorough
probe of the juror's mind to the end that it may thus be satisfactorily
determined whether such juror, if selected to try the accused, would ac-
cord to him, as well as to the People, a perfectly fair trial upon the evi-
dence and the principles of law appropriate to the case.
212. 5 Cal. 347 (1855).
213. 57 Cal. 102 (1880).
214. 283 U.S. 308 (1931). In Aldridge, the United States Supreme Court
noted that the
right to examine jurors on the voir dire as to the existence of a disquali-
fying state of mind has been upheld with respect to other races than the
black race, and in relation to religious and other prejudices of a serious
character.
Id. at 313.
215. People v. Buyle, 22 Cal. App. 2d 143, 70 P.2d 955, (1937); People v.
Vitelle, 61 Cal. App. 695, 215 P. 693 (1923); People v. Wismer, 58 Cal. App.
679, 209 P. 259 (1922).
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is also a proper subject for voir dire.216
Prospective jurors may also be questioned as to their feelings
regarding the type of crime involved.217 Moreover, if the defend-
ant might testify, it is proper to inquire as to possible bias regard-
ing prior convictions. 2 18
Finally, it should be noted that voir dire questions directed
to laying a foundation for peremptory challenges have generally
been held improper, 219 although there is substantial authority to
the contrary. 220 And it is clear that an appeal from a trial judge's
decision as to a particular juror or voir dire question will not lie
unless all peremptory challenges have been exhausted. 22
3. Voir dire on sex-based biases. In Sail'er Inn, Inc. v.
Kirby2 22 the California Supreme Court established sex discrimina-
tion as a matter of particular judicial concern under California law.
The case involved challenges to section 25656 of the California
Business and Professions Code, which prohibited women from
tending bar except when they were licensees, wives of licensees,
or singly or with their husbands sole shareholders of a corporation
holding the license. In addition to holding that the provision vio-
lated other provisions of state and federal law,228 the court held
that section 25656 violated the equal protection clause of the Cali-
216. People v. Boorman, 142 Cal. App. 2d 85, 297 P.2d 741 (1956); Leibman
v. Curtis, 138 Cal. App. 2d 222, 292 P.2d 270 (1955); Walker v. Greenberger,
63 Cal. App. 2d 457, 147 P.2d 105 (1944).
217. People v. Tamasovich, 56 Cal. App. 520, 206 P. 119 (1922).
218. People v. Ranney, 213 Cal. 70, 1 P.2d 43 (1931). See also Rousseau
v. West Coast House Movers, 256 Cal. App. 2d 878, 880, 64 Cal. Rptr. 655, 657(1968) where it was held that questions were acceptable which covered
prior knowledge of or contact with the parties or their attorneys; knowl-
edge of the facts of the case; the reality of pain and suffering; experience
in adjustment of claims; racial, ethnic, and religious prejudice; prior in-juries; current litigation; ability to apply the law as given by the court;
occupations of the jurors and their spouses; prior jury service; and other
subjects relating to the prospective jurors' ability to try the case fairly
and impartially.
219. People v. Crowe, 8 Cal. 3d 815, 824, 506 P.2d 193, 199, 106 Cal. Rptr.
369, 375 (1973); People v. Rigney, 55 Cal. 2d 236, 244, 359 P.2d 23, 27, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 625, 629 ('1961); People v. Ferlin, 203 Cal. 587, 265 P. 230 (1928); People
v. Edwards, 163 Cal. 752, 127 P. 58 (1912).
220. People v. Terry, 61 Cal. 2d 137, 390 P.2d 381, 37 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1964);
People v. Car Soy, 57 Cal. 102 (1880); People v. Boorman, 142 Cal. App. 2d
85, 297 P.2d 741 (1956); Walker v. Greenberger, 63 'Cal. App. 2d 457, 147 P.2d
105 (1944). Cf. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1964).
221. People v. Wilkes, 44 Cal. 2d 679, 284 P.2d 481 (1955).
222. 5 Cal. 3d 1,485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
223. The court also held that section 25656 violated CAL. CONST. art. XX, §
18, which provides that "[a] person may not be disqualified because of sex, from
entering or pursuing a lawful business, vocation, or profession," 5 Cal. 3d at 8-
10, 485 P.2d at 533-34, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 333-34, and that section 25656 violated
section 2000e-2 of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1970)). Id. at 10-15, 485 P.2d at 534-37, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 334-37.
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fornia Constitution. 24 Probably more significant than the holding
is the standard of review on this issue applied by the court. The
court subjected the statutory provision to "strict scrutiny," appli-
cable to cases involving "suspect classifications" and "fundamental
interests, 225 for two reasons: "first, because the statute limits the
fundamental right of one class of persons to pursue a lawful pro-
fession, and second, because classifications based upon sex should
be treated as suspect. '226 The reasons for the court's decision that
sex-based discriminations should be "suspect" were clear and, in-
deed, were essentially identical to those later cited by the United
States Supreme Court plurality in Frontiero:
Sex, like race and lineage, is an immutable trait, a status
into which the class members are locked by the accident of
birth. What differentiates sex from nonsuspect statuses, such
as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the re-
cognized suspect classifications is that the characteristic fre-
quently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute
to society. . . The result is that the whole class is rele-
gated to an inferior legal status without regard to the capa-
bilities or characteristics of its individual members ...
Where ,the relation between characteristic and evil to be pre-
vented is so itenuous, courts must look closely at classifications
based on that characteristic lest outdated social stereotypes
result in invidious laws or practices.
Another characteristic which underlies all suspect classi-
fications is the stigma of inferioity and second class citizen-
ship associated with them. . . . Women, like Negroes,
aliens, and the poor have historically labored under severe le-
gal and social disabilities. Like black citizens, they were, for
many years, denied the right to vote and, until recently, the
right to serve on juries in many states. They are excluded
from or discriminated against in employment and educational
opportunities. Married women in particular have been
treated as inferior persons in numerous laws relating to prop-
erty and independent business ownership and the right to
make contracts.
Laws which disable women from full participation in the
political, business and economic arenas are often character-
ized as "protective" and beneficial. Those same laws applied
to racial or ethnic minorities would readily be recognized as
invidious and impermissible. The pedestal upon which women
have been placed has all too often, upon closer inspection,
been revealed as a cage. We conclude that the sexual class-
ifications are properly treated as suspect, particularly when
224. The court also held that section 25656 violated the equal protection clause
of the United States Constitution.
225. Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 784-85, 471 P.2d 487, 500-01, 87
Cal. Rptr. 839, 852-53 (1970).
226. 5 Cal. 3d at 17, 485 P.2d at 539, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
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those classifications are made with respect to a fundamental
interest such as employment. 227
The court found no interest, "compelling" or otherwise, to just-
ify the statute.228
Sail'er Inn establishes a clear and critical constitutional dis-
tinction between federal law and California law regarding sex-
based discrimination. 229  The significance of that distinction with
227. Id. at -18-20, 485 P.2d at 540-41, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 340-41 (footnotes
omitted).
228. Indeed, the court was wholly unimpressed with the arguments advanced
on behalf of the statute:
Two Court of Appeal cases which uphold section 25656 against equalprotection challenge (Hargens v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. App. Bd. (1968)263 Cal. App. 2d 601 ][69 Cal. Rptr. 868]; People v. Jemnez (1942)
49 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 739 [12 P.2d 543]) suggest two interests servedby the statute; first that women who do not have an interest by way
of ownership or marriage in the liquor license will not be sufficiently
restrained from committing "improprieties," and, second, that women
bartenders would be an "unwholesome influence" on young people and
the general public.
The first rationale rests upon the peculiar and wholly unacceptablegeneralization that women in bars, unrestrained by husbands or the risk
of losing a liquor license, will commit improper acts. This rationalefails as a compelling state interest because it is wholly arbitrary and
without support in logic or experience.
The second rationale-that women bartenders would be an "un-
wholesome influence" on the public-is even weaker than the first. The
claim of unwholesomeness is contradicted by statutes which permit
women to work as cocktail waitresses, serve beer and wine from behind
a bar (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25655), or tend bar if they or their husbandshold a liquor license. The objection appears to be based upon notions
of what is a "ladylike" or proper pursuit for a woman in our society
rather than any ascertainable evil effects of permitting women to laborbehind those "permanently affixed fixtures" known as bars. Such no-
tions cannot justify discrimination against women in employment.
Id. at 20-21, 485 P.2d at 541-42, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 341-42.
229. See also Brenden v. Independent Sch. Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Minn.
1972); Hardy v. Stumpf, 37 Cal. App. 3d 958, 112 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1974). But
see Long v. State Personnel Bd., 41 Cal. App. 3d 1000, 1,16 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1974),
upholding a "male-only" certification requirement which prohibited a female
Methodist minister from securing a position as chaplain at a state youth training
center, on the ground that a "female chaplain's own sense of modesty might finditself substantially offended if the male inmates were so uninhibited as to disre-
gard her presence [when she entered their living quarters, the informality of male
dormitories being a 'matter of common knowledge']" and that the requirement
"protects" women by not making them subject to sexual or other physical attack.
id. at 1010-11, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 568-69.
The "Keep Them Barefoot and Pregnant" Award for adolescent sexual atti-
tudes among California's judiciary, however, probably should go to Locker v.
Kirby, 31 Cal. App. 3d 520, 107 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1973), in which the court held
that a prohibition on employing or using topless waitresses in premises where
liquor is sold did not violate equal protection concepts by failing to prohibit dis-
play of the naked male chest:
As was the case with the Supreme Court in Boreta, "We decline toprobe the metaphysics of toplessness 'as such.'" (2 Cal. 3d at p.107)
We note, however, the indisputable fact that the naked female breast hasfor centuries been a symbol of sexuality but that no such generalization
can be made about the male chest. Given the fact and the obvious phys-ical differences between mature male and female breasts, and also given
the state's interest in regulating the sale of alcoholic beverages and the
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respect to voir dire as to sex-based prejudices is indicated by the
United States Supreme Court decision in Ham. The Court in
Ham noted: "The inquiry as to racial prejudice derives its con-
stitutional stature from the firmly established precedent of Al-
dridge and the numerous state cases upon which it relied.
" . .,280 The "numerous state cases" relied upon in Aldridge,
however, were not limited to those involving prejudice against
black people: they included cases where the right to voir dire had
been held to apply where there was a danger of prejudice against
members of other racial minorities and members of particular re-
ligious groups. As one commentator has noted,
[s]ince nonracial prejudice may have an equally detrimental
effect on a juror's ability to be impartial the reasoning of
the A ldridge and Ham decisions would seem to apply with
equal force where nonracial prejudice is involved.281
The significance of Sail'er Inn in this context is that the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court declared therein that as a matter of state
constitutional law, sex discrimination is to be treated by the same
standards as race discrimination. Thus the constitutional standard
applied in California state courts on issues of sex discrimination
is much stricter than the standard applied in federal courts. While
the full implications of this distinction are unclear, at the very least
it would appear that a female defendant in a California state court
would stand in a position directly analogous to that of defendant
Ham: her federal constitutional right to the "essential demands
of fairness" at her trial, secured by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, would guarantee her the right to examine
prospective jurors on voir dire as to possible sex-based prejudices.
Similarly, denial of the opportunity to voir dire as to sex-based
biases would violate the constitutional guarantee of due process
of law. It is less clear whether this analysis would apply with
equal force where the defense attorney or witnesses at the trial
are women, as opposed to the defendant, but lower court cases
broad sweep of authority which the states have in this area by virtue
of the Twenty-First Amendment we hold that rule 143.2 does not offend
equal protection concepts. There is clearly a necessary connection be-
tween that which is sought to be prevented and the class to which the
rule is directed.
Id. at 526, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 450-51. No doubt congratulating itself on its rich
sense of humor, the court added:
Some discussion of the place of openly exposed female bosom in
contemporary society is found in Boreta itself (2 Cal. 3d at pp.
101-102). Those interested in the subject are also referred to Robins
v. County of Los Angeles, 248 Cal. App. 2d 1 E[56 Cal. Rptr. 853] and
In re Davis, 242 Cal. App. 2d 645 [51 Cal. Rptr. 702].
Id. at n.5, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 450 n.5.
230. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 528 (1973).
231. Note, Exploring Racial Prejudice on Voir Dire: Constitutional Require-
ments and Policy Considerations, 54 B.U.L. Rnv. 384, 418-19 (1974).
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following Ham have followed the spirit of the opinion and indicate
that it would.2 2 The purpose of voir dire, after all, is to expose
those biases which would deny the defendant a fair trial, and it
is the particular distinction of the California Supreme Court's
opinion in Sailer Inn that it recognizes the pervasive effects of
sex-based discrimination and provides the legal foundation for
combating centuries of "protective" oppression.
CONCLUSION
It is fundamental to the administration of justice that litigants
have their rights adjudicated by jurors whose minds are free of
any influence predisposing them to a particular result. The state
of mind amounting to prejudice has no place in the jury box, and
it is essential to the American judicial system that prejudices and
predisposing attitudes be explored prior to enpanelment, thus in-
suring as far as practicable an impartial jury.
If sexist attitudes have the potentiality to compromise the
rights of a litigant-male or female-those biases must be brought
forth on voir dire, and those potential jurors holding such concep-
tions should be treated as would be a juror with unfounded or
predisposing attitudes based on a litigant's race. Because we seek
a system characterized by fairness to all parties, if sex stereotypes
are permitted to remain buried in the minds of the jury until they
are manifested in final deliberation, a party to the action may have
his or her rights unjustly influenced. The solution therefore is
to permit wide latitude in counsel's voir dire on any matter of pos-
sible significance to the client.
It is the position of this article that sexist attitudes frequently
operate to the detriment of female defendants, female attorneys
and any other party whose case involves female participants, such
as a male defendant whose principal witness is female or whose
attorney is female. Hopefully, enactment of the Equal Rights
Amendment or the judicial recognition of sex as a suspect classi-
fication would do much to eliminate at least the most blatant forms
of sex discrimination in the courtroom.
No less than racial prejudice, sex-based prejudice may be a
factor which, if undetected in a juror, may compromise the rights
of a person whose most fundamental interests are at stake. Such
attitudes have no place in modern jurisprudence, and it is the right
and duty of counsel to explore sexist attitudes and insist that juries
be free of all those persons whose preconceived notions about men
and women prevent the unbiased fact finding which is the charge
of the jury.
232. See United States v. Booker, 480 F.2d '1310 (7th Cir. 1973), and United
States v. Robinson, 485 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1973).
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APPENDIX
MODEL VOIR DIRE
A. Voir Dire Technique
Trial counsel experienced in combating racism in jury trials
through voir dire have developed a number of tactical principles which
are relevant and helpful to attorneys concerned with sexism on the
jury.2 8
First, it is important to ask open-ended questions. Judges may be
reluctant to allow counsel to ask prospective jurors questions like "What
do you think of the movement for women's liberation?" Such questions,
however, are critical to the success of an anti-sexist voir dire. Ques-
tions which permit a "yes" or "no" answer reveal very little about the
prospective juror. Counsel should ask as many open-ended questions
as possible and stress the necessity of such questions when confronted
by the trial judge.
Second, a question permitting a "yes" or "no" response may pro-
vide an opportunity for an open-ended question. Thus the question,
"Have you ever discussed the women's liberation movement with a
friend?" may be answered "yes" or "no." The next question, however,
should be: "What was the discussion about?"
Third, since voir dire seeks to make jurors aware of their sexist
attitudes, and the effects of those attitudes, it may be useful to ask ques-
tions which elicit some kind of emotional reaction. Questions such as,
"Would you prefer that your boss be a man or a woman?" or "Why
do you think a woman has never been named to the United States
Supreme Court?" may confuse or embarrass a juror, but they may also
start the juror thinking about feelings which he never knew he had.
Fourth, questions which elicit a stereotyped reaction, as well as
,those calling forth an emotional response, may be useful. The question,
"Do you like the advertisements featuring women models which appear
in the New York Times Sunday Magazine?" will ordinarily receive a
"yes" answer. The next question should be, "Do you know that many
women find it degrading that women should be displayed in advertise-
ments for the sole purpose of selling cigarettes, liquor, luggage, vaca-
tions, even men's clothes?" In response to the first question, the juror
may place himself in a position of reacting in a stereotyped manner.
The second question forces the juror to recognize that many women are
insulted by that same stereotype.
Fifth, it may be useful to ask a question which evokes a lie as
an answer. Few men honestly believe that a woman could do their
job as well as they do it. A question to that effect, however, will almost
always elicit an affirmative declaration. Such a question may awaken
the juror to conflicts of values and his own biases against women.
233. The following discussion is based upon LA RAZA Dm~ENnArs, supra note
67, at 2-3,
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Sixth, particularly in federal courts, trial counsel may foster
empathy with prospective women jurors by demanding that the judge
ask questions in a sex-blind manner. For example, most judges will,
as a preliminary matter, ask a male juror his occupation. If the pros-
pective juror is a woman, the judge might ask her occupation, and will
certainly ask the woman her husband's occupation. The judge may
then be challenged by defense counsel with the demand that he simi-
larly ask male prospective jurors the occupations of their wives.
Seventh, while it is important to make jurors see that they have
sexist feelings, it is of prime importance to trial counsel to recognize
that such feelings influence the way in which jurors perceive the evi-
dence in the case and consequently may affect the rights of the client.
The connection can be made during the closing argument, in a state-
ment such as this:
These preconceptions, or prejudices, are usually subcon-
scions. After all, no one really thinks of himself as discrimi-
nating against women on the basis of their sex. But these
stereotypes and feelings influence jurors as the trial unfolds.
They affect how you view the testimony, whom you believe,
what facts you think are realistic, and a number of other in-
tangibles. Therefore the voir dire questions were intended
to make each juror look inside himself. That's all the
defendant is asking, for each of you to look at these hidden
prejudices and to try to view the evidence without any stereo-
types. Because that's what a fair trial is all about.23 4
This closing statement serves two other important functions: it serves
as an apology to the jury for possibly having offended any of them on
the voir dire, and it limits the degree to which the prosecutor can claim
that the defense sought to make a run-of-the-mill case into a women's
liberation cause cjldbre. The effects of the voir dire in establishing
feelings of solidarity and sisterhood between women jurors and the
female defendant, attorney, or defense witness, have already been
noted.235
An anti-sexism voir dire may make a lot of people in the courtroom
uncomfortable and even hostile. If the judge becomes hostile, he may
restrict the scope of the voir dire. Trial counsel should prepare for this
eventuality and should bring to court a pretrial brief supporting the
right -to an extensive voir dire, particularly on matters so fundamentally
prejudicial as sex-based biases. Clerks, marshals, and reporters may
get uptight, although their feelings will not have a substantial effect on
the proceedings. Most important, prospective jurors may feel threatened
'by the questions. There is no easy solution to this dilemma, but coun-
sel must be extremely watchful of the line between education and ex-
ploration of attitudes, on the one hand, and antagonism and harassment
on the other. One suggestion is that the most disturbing questions, such
234. Id. at 2.
235. See note 18 supra.
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as, "Do your wife's opinions carry as much weight in your household
as your own?" might be saved for jurors whom counsel has already
decided to excuse. At worst, the defense will have to excuse the juror
with a peremptory, but it is possible that the juror will demonstrate his
prejudice to a degree that will allow him to be excused for cause. In
addition, the emotion-eliciting question may raise the consciousnesses
of the other jurors.
In addition, some general suggestions may be helpful. Spacing the
questions during the entire voir dire is important-asking each juror
every question will quickly put everyone to sleep and ruin the effective-
ness of the examination. The best questions should be asked of the
first few jurors, since all the prospective jurors will still be listening then.
All the veniremen should be asked what they think of the women's lib-
eration movement-it is a topic which most people have an opinion on
and which is subject to wide ranges of emotions and attitudes, and the
,answer may reveal !a lot about the prospective juror's feelings. If the
defendant is a woman, counsel should ask some questions while stand-
ing behind her, forcing the juror to look at her when he answers. If
a prospective juror appears to be helpful for the defense, counsel should
not ask too many questions, for fear of exposing attitudes which the
prosecutor will move to excuse. Finally, if under local procedure the
voir dire is not recorded, counsel should. demand that a record be kept.
This record may be important for purposes of appeal, and may be in-
structive to counsel in preparing later voir dires.
B. Sample Voir Dire Questions
The questions below are arranged very generally into categories,
but neither the number of categories nor the groups of questions are
by any means exhaustive. They are designed only to provide sugges-
tion for areas which may be fruitfully covered in an anti-sexism voir
dire.
The questions cover a number of areas: which ones are appro-
priate in any particular instance will depend upon the circumstances of
the individual case. Even the most basic question as to sex-based
biases may engender a hostile reaction from opposing counsel or the
judge.23 6  In addition to general questions on sex-based prejudices,
236. When San Francisco attorney Susan B. Jordan sought to raise the issue
of sex-based biases during a voir dire examination, the following exchange oc-
curred:
Miss Jordan: You understand, don't you, that the questions we are go-
ing to ask are designed only to protect the rights of the defendant
Mr. Hughes, and to guarantee a fair trial to both sides, and not
meant to intimidate or anger you. You understand that, all of
you, don't you?
(All four members of the panel nodded affirmatively.)
Is there anything in so far as this case or the lawyers in it that
bothers you in any way at all?
Is there anything about the fact that I'm a woman and my assistant
here is a woman and that we are here trying this case, and we
aren't home washing the dishes or taking care of the baby, does that
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questions should be selected which are appropriate 'to specific aspects of
the case and the proceedings: the particular charges against the defen-
dant; whether a woman is alleged to be a principal or an accessory to
a crime, or a complaining witness; what roles women will likely be
shown to have played in the incident at issue, as the evidence comes
in; whether the personalities or group associations of those women might
be significant in the case or in the selection of the jury; whether a
female defendant or witness is actively involved in the women's move-
ment, and whether that fact might be significant in the case or in the
selection of the jury; whether a female defendant or witness is a
lesbian, and whether that might be significant; whether the female
defendant will have a large number of women supporters in the court-
room; whether the defendant or counsel is a woman, or both. It will
be evident that some of the questions below might not be appropriate
in a criminal trial but would be appropriate in a civil proceeding, for
example, a Title VII case on sex discrimination in employment, or a
personal injury case where the issue is the amount of damages to be
recovered 'by a woman plaintiff for lost wages or loss of earning capacity.
Some questions will be appropriate only where sex-based prejudices or
women's rights become central issues, as in a 'trial involving an out-
spoken and widely-known feminist. 237
The phrasing of a question may be critical. There is a great differ-
ence between "Do you know who Lily Tomlin is?" and "Are you aware
that Lily Tomlin refuses to play roles in comedy sketches which demean
women?" Finally, it is often necessary to follow up an exploratory
question with further inquiries designed to pin down the attitudes
elicited. Some examples of this technique will follow. 238
bother you in any way?
Mr. Parrish [the district attorney]: Objection. It bothers me.
The Court: What the lawyers say is not testimony, and whether it both-
ers you or me or Mr. Parrish is incidental. Another question.
Miss Jordan: Would the fact that myself and my assistant are women
prejudice you against this defendant?
(All four members of the panel nodded affirmatively.)
If you found yourself thinking that, would you do everything in
your power to set that feeling aside and give Mr. Hughes a fair
trial?
(All four members of the panel answered yes.)
Conversation between the author and Susan B. Jordan, San Francisco, Calif., Apr.
16, 1975.
237. See, e.g., Blitman & Green, Inez Garcia on Trial, Ms., May, 1975, at 49.
An argument may be made for not asking voir dire questions designed to
bring out sex-based prejudices, at least in certain circumstances. Where a woman
is a co-defendant in a criminal prosecution, for example, sexist attitudes may make
it difficult for jurors to see the woman as a principal in the crime, as opposed
to an accomplice, thus making her the beneficiary of a kind of "benign neglect."
Indeed, it may be that the sex of the attorney is considerably more important than
that of the defendant, since lawyers are the focal actors in the courtroom, rather
than the parties. Conversation between the author and Anne Flower Cumings,
May 9, 1975, San Francisco, Calif.
238. Note, Voir Dire: Strategy and Tactics in the Defense of Social and Polit-
ical Activists, 5 AKRON L. Rv. 265, 285 (1972), provides several examples of
questions which may alienate prospective jurors without eliciting sincere attitudes:
Q. Was the Kent R.O.T.C. building worth more than one student?
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1. Introducing the Issues
Q. Is there anything about this case which will prevent you from
giving the defendant a fair trial?
Q. Do you think that it is unusual that the defendant is a wo-
man? Why do you think that it is unusual?
Q. Were you surprised when you walked into court and saw
that the attorney representing the defendant is a woman?
Q. Do you think that women are as observant about details as
men?
Q. Were you surprised when you saw the many women sitting
in the visitors' section of the courtroom?
2. General Stereotypes
Q. Have you ever heard women called "the weaker sex"? Do
you think that is true? In what way? Are you aware that
studies have shown that women live longer than men and have
more resistance to disease and to stress?
Q. Have you ever gotten behind a "woman driver" and won-
dered how she could be so bad? Did you know that, statisti-
cally, women have fewer accidents than men?
Q. Do you feel that the long days you put in at work are a lot
harder than the housework your wife does? Did you know
that the average housewife works about a 100-hour work-
week?
3. Local and National Figures
Q. Have you ever heard of Bella Abzug? Do you thinks she is an
effective member of the House of Representatives? Why?
(Why not?)
Q. Do you know who Shirley Chisholm is? Are you aware that
she was the first woman to make a serious attempt at running
for President of the United States?
Q. Have you ever heard of Shirley Hufstedler, who is a judge
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit?
Q. Do you know who Ella Grasso is? Do you think she is doing
a good job as governor of Connecticut? Why? (Why not?)
How about the Library? The Administration Building? Let me
ask you this-is one student worth more than the Empire State
Building?
Q. Why are poor people poor? Why are rich people rich?
Q. Are you an honest person?
Q. Then you can honestly tell me that you would not mind a Black
family living next door to you, right?
Several of the questions in the following section make use of material in Verbal
Karate, in SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL, supra note 2, at 557. See also A. GINGER,
JUR SELECTION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 365-441, 521-662 (1975).
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Q. Have you ever heard of Constance Baker Motley, who is a
judge of the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York?
Q. Can you imagine anyone referring to one of these women as
a "girl"?
Q. Do you know the magazine of which Gloria Steinem is the
editor?
Q. Do you know who Lily Tomlin is? Are you aware that she has
refused to perform in comedy sketches which show women in
demeaning roles?
Q. Do you know who the founder of the National Organization
of Women is?
4. Working Women
Q. Have you ever wondered why some women complain about
having to stay at home during the day to take care of the
house, when you have to work? Have you ever thought, If
they don't like staying home, why don't they go out and get
a job?
Q. Have you ever heard about civil rights suits against giant cor-
porations, like the recent suit against the telephone company,
charging discrimination against women in employment? Have
you ever wondered what all the fuss was about?
Q. Did you know that 40% of all working-age women work?
Did you know that women are 35% of the work force?
Q. Did you know that 28 million women in America work at
more menial jobs, at lower pay, and suffer higher unemploy-
ment than men?
Q. Did you know that in 1900 the typical woman worker was 26
and single; now she is 41 and married?
Q. Have you ever thought about the fact that so many women
work in offices as secretaries or clerks? Did you know that in
about 70% of those office and clerical jobs, men get paid
more than women-for exactly the same work?
Q. Have you heard about high rates of female absenteeism from
jobs? Did you know that the Public Health Service has found
that men lose more days from work each year than do women
-- even including days off for pregnancy and childbirth?
Q. Did you know that in 1920 a higher proportion of women
received Ph.D's than do today?
Q. Did you know that of the Americans who earn more than
$10,000 a year, less than 5% are women?
Q. Did you know that about one-fifth of employed women with
Bachelor's degrees have jobs in such categories as clerks, fac-
tory workers, and cooks?
5. The Law and Women Lawyers
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Q. Are you surprised to see a woman practicing before you today?
Did you know that only about 3% of the lawyers practicing
in the United States today are women?
Q. Do you think that a woman can handle difficult questions as
well as a man? Do you think that a woman can be as assertive
as a man?
Q. Do you feel that women should not be aggressive? Do
"pushy" women make you uncomfortable?
Q. Did you know that employment discrimination also affects
women lawyers-they earn $2,000 less than men when they
graduate from law school, about $4,000 less five years later,
and about $8,000 less nine years after graduation?
Q. But did you know that there are no significant differences
between men and women either in class rank in law schol or
in honors such as law review?
Q. Have you ever heard of the Equal Rights Amendment? What
have you heard? Would you vote for it if you were a state
legislator?
6. The Women's Movement
Q. Have you ever discussed the women's liberation movement
with a friend? What was the discussion about?
Q. Have you ever heard women involved in the women's move-
ment refer to other women as "sisters"? What do you think
they meant by this?
Q. Have you ever read the book, Sisterhood is Powerful?
0. Do you know who Kate Millett is?
Q. Have you ever heard of Simone de Beauvoir?
Q. Have you ever read Ms. magazine.? Do you know why it is
called "Ms."?
Q. Do you think women in the women's movement hate men?
Q. Do you think women in the women's movement have legiti-
mate grievances?
7. Media Images of Women
Q. Have you ever seen the Geritol commercial where the man
looks at his wife and says, "I think I'll keep her"? Do you
think this image of a wife as a mere possession is demeaning
to women?
Q. Have you ever seen the advertisement on television for Win-
chester "Little Cigars," in which the handsome young man
with the mustache in the leather hat offers a Winchester to a
beautiful young woman . . . then heads her off somewhere
into the jungle or behind a circus tent? Why do you think
a commercial for cigars is presented like that?
Q. Have you ever seen any of the James Bond movies? Have
you noticed any major roles for women in those movies?
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Q. Have you ever seen the advertisement in the newspaper show-
ing a very pretty young stewardess, who says, "I'm Jennifer.
Fly me to Miami"? Why does she say, "Fly me"?
Q. Do you ever read Playboy magazine? Are you aware of any
magazines which feature centerfolds with pictures of men in
the nude? Did you ever see the centerfold in Cosmopolitan
with Burt Reynolds in the nude? Did you think he looked
pretty silly sitting there with no clothes on?
Q. Have you ever seen the Ultra-Brite commercial, in which a
young woman gives a young man a kiss, in fact several kisses,
for using that particular brand of toothpaste?
Q. Have you ever seen the advertisement for breath mints which
asks, "If he kissed you once, will he kiss you again? Be cer-
tain with Certs"?
9. Abortion
0. Did you know that more than 1 million abortions a year are
performed in the United States?
Q. Do you think that this is wrong?
Q. Did you know that in the past, 80% of all women in New
York City who died from abortions were black or Latin?
10. Gay Women
Q. Would you be surprised if you learned that the defendant is
a lesbian?
Q. Do you think that homosexuals are sick?
Q. Do you know any gay women?
Q. Did you know that Gertrude Stein, Willa Cather, and Virginia
Woolf were all lesbians?
Q. Have you ever felt very close to another man (woman)?
Q. Do you think that women should not love women?
Q. Do you think that homosexuals are not to be trusted?
11. The Personal Is Political
Q. At home, does your wife's opinion count as much as yours?
Q. If your wife were pregnant, would you want a son or a daugh-
ter?
Q. Do you think a woman could do your job as well as you?
Q. Do you think it's all right for married men to play around?
Married women?
Q. At home, do you (does your husband) ever cook the meals?
Q. Who does the shopping for food in your house?
Q. Who keeps the checkbook in your house?
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Q. If your child has a problem, does the child come to you or
your wife?
Q. Do you ever worry that your son is a sissy?
Q. Would you want your daughter to play on a girls' Little
League baseball team?
